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A B ST R ACT. Arbitration theory and doctrine are dominated by a narrative conceptualizing
arbitration via reflection on the qualities of litigation. Litigation, the thought goes, is more pro-
cedurally rigorous, but takes longer and costs more; arbitration, on the other hand, is faster and
cheaper, but provides fewer procedural safeguards. Notwithstanding these differences, the
standard narrative sees both arbitration and litigation as ultimately serving the same purpose:
resolving disputes. This narrative has been pervasive, not only becoming entrenched in recent
Supreme Court decisions, but also garnering support from arbitration critics and supporters
alike.
However, the exclusive focus on this standard narrative has left unexplored a competing
arbitral narrative - a counter-narrative of sorts - that examines the contexts in which arbitration
differs from adjudication because it aims to promote an alternative set of values beyond simply
resolving disputes. The failure to consider this counter-narrative has prevented legal doctrine
from accounting for contexts in which arbitration seeks to amplify the autonomy of parties to
pursue shared values by resolving their disputes in the arbitral forum.
This arbitral counter-narrative filters into numerous contexts, but it finds its paradigmatic
application in the context of religious arbitration. When parties agree to religious forms of arbi-
tration, they select religious authorities to resolve disputes in accordance with religious law. The-
se forms of arbitration are embraced not solely because they help to resolve disputes, but also
because they enable parties to resolve disputes in accordance with shared religious principles and
values. If successfully incorporated into current legal doctrine, this arbitral counter-narrative
could unlock the transformative potential of arbitration, enabling parties to employ arbitration
not simply as an expedient venue for resolving disputes, but also as an alternative forum for
breathing life into mutually shared values.
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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration theory and doctrine are dominated by an overarching narrative
that conceptualizes arbitration as functionally equivalent to litigation.' This
narrative views arbitration and litigation as parallel institutions, both providing
parties with a method for resolving their dispute. On one side of this equation
is litigation, procedurally rigorous but expensive. On the other side is arbitra-
tion, faster and cheaper but with fewer procedural safeguards. Both arbitration
and litigation, however, ultimately serve the same purpose: dispute resolution.
This standard narrative has been recapitulated repeatedly in a string of re-
cent Supreme Court decisions touting arbitration's streamlined process over
the perceived rigors of litigation.2 And both critics and supporters of arbitra-
tion have largely adopted this narrative. Critics bemoan arbitration's failure to
provide the procedural safeguards typical of litigation3 and suggest that the
parties' choice to forego litigation often lacks true consent.4 Supporters of arbi-
tration counter that concerns over consent -or lack thereof- in selecting arbi-
tration over litigation are exaggerated and that parties benefit from arbitra-
tion's relative procedural informality, which enables arbitrators to mete out
justice faster and more cheaply than courts.' Notwithstanding these differ-
ences, there is a common thread to these arguments: arbitration and litigation,
first and foremost, are both viewed as methods of dispute resolution.
One of the few challenges to this standard narrative suggests that it fails to
provide an accurate depiction of litigation. Critics, most famously Owen Fiss
and Judith Resnik, have argued that the purpose of litigation is not simply to
resolve disputes, but also to promote public values by enabling judges to ar-
ticulate, interpret, and enforce central legal rules and principles.6 On this view,
however, arbitration is still viewed as merely achieving the more modest objec-
tive of resolving disputes between the parties. There is, of course, good reason
1. See, e.g., 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AwARDS, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 2.6.2 (1999) ("[T]he purpose of both
forms is to obtain justice between the parties."); see also Daniel Markovits, Arbitration's Arbi-
trage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 431
n.1, 433 (2010) (characterizing this narrative as the "displacement thesis" and collecting ex-
amples).
2. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing this shift in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence).
3. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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for this. Parties typically consent to arbitration because it provides an efficient
and cheaper method for resolving disputes.7
But the law has largely failed to account for a competing arbitral narrative,
in which arbitration differs from adjudication because arbitration aims to pro-
mote an alternative set of values beyond simply resolving disputes.8 Indeed, in
a wide range of contexts, arbitration serves a "jurisgenerative" function, ampli-
fying the parties' autonomous ability to pursue shared values in the dispute
resolution context.9 Thus, various groups - such as trade associations, ethnic
communities, and families" - adopt specific procedures to select arbitrators,
choose the governing law, and incorporate community norms in order to en-
sure that their dispute resolution forum reflects the parties' shared values.
While techniques and methods vary, these forms of arbitration share a com-
mon feature: they all embrace arbitration at least in part because of the values
the selected form of arbitration promotes.
Taken together, these forms of arbitration coalesce into an arbitral counter-
narrative. This counter-narrative implicitly critiques debates over arbitration's
adequacy as a method of dispute resolution, and it encourages us to account for
arbitration's broader social benefits. Focusing only on the standard arbitration
7. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
8. There have been, to be sure, a few scholars who have identified this dynamic. See Amy J.
Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 123 (2007); E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent
Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 275 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming]; E. Gary Spitko,Judge
Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065 (1999) [hereinafter
Spitko, Judge Not]; see also notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
Others have ventured down this road with more limited aspirations in mind. See, e.g.,
Roger I. Abrams et al., Arbitral Therapy, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1751 (1994) (explaining the
therapeutic value of arbitration with a particular focus on labor arbitration); Leo Kanowitz,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 239, 245-55 (1987) (describing the pragmatic value of arbitration as related to public val-
ues). Still others have focused more broadly on the public values enhanced by alternative
dispute resolution, extending those insights to arbitration as well. See, e.g., Clark Freshman,
Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: Community-
Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1687 (1997) (articulating
a community-enhancing understanding of mediation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and
Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv.
485, 504-05 (1985) (describing substantive justice arguments for settlement); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In
Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) (describing the positive aspects of settlement from a
public values perspective).
9. The term "jurisgenerative" famously comes from Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
io. See infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
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narrative, which uses litigation as the barometer, misses the transformative
purposes around which at least some forms of arbitration are organized. And
while most arbitrations fall squarely within the standard arbitral narrative, the
failure to account for arbitration's counter-narrative has already led to doctrinal
problems -problems that will likely multiply if the exclusive focus on the
standard narrative continues. By flattening arbitration doctrine and discount-
ing the contexts in which arbitration is pursued for purposes beyond garden-
variety dispute resolution, courts have too frequently, and too unreflectively,
adopted the bare equation of litigation and arbitration."
Moreover, even courts that have resisted the bare equation of the purposes
of arbitration and litigation have not tried to articulate the ways in which arbi-
tration does differ from litigation. Thus, they have not considered whether
there are differences between various forms of arbitration. 2 One of the chief
lessons of arbitration's counter-narrative is that arbitration is not monolithic;
parties benefit from arbitration when the forum is successful at promoting the
unique values shared by the parties. To the extent that courts fail to account for
the diversity of arbitration, they also misconstrue the nature of the differences
between arbitration and litigation.
All told, then, courts have adopted an either/or strategy: some cases have
mistakenly equated arbitration and litigation, while other cases have rejected
the equation but without considering the circumstances under which the equa-
tion might actually be accurate. In embracing this uniform conceptualization of
arbitration, courts have not adequately accounted for either the differences be-
tween litigation and arbitration or the internal differences between various
forms of arbitration. In short, courts have failed to adequately account for the
lessons to be learned from arbitration's counter-narrative.
This failure to consciously consider arbitration in all of its dimensions has
led to the development of doctrine that fails to account for the fact that some
arbitral fora are geared toward achieving fundamental, transformative objec-
tives that differ from those to which litigation aspires. Courts have become too
willing to assume the standard arbitral narrative -that arbitration is simply a
method for resolving disputes - and to thereby import rules from the litigation
context into the arbitration context. In so doing, courts undermine the ability
of various forms of arbitration to promote an alternative set of fundamental
values successfully.
In order to correct this narrow focus on the standard arbitral narrative, we
must look to the contexts in which arbitration aims to achieve objectives be-
yond mere dispute resolution - a dynamic perhaps best exemplified in religious
11. See infra Part III.A.
1a. For an example, see infra notes 160-176 and accompanying text.
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arbitration. When parties agree to religious forms of arbitration, they select re-
ligious authorities to resolve disputes in accordance with religious law. Parties
embrace this form of arbitration not solely because it is a useful mechanism for
dispute resolution, but because these arbitrations are meant to enable parties to
resolve a dispute in accordance with shared religious principles and values. In
turn, these principles and values create the framework under which procedural
and substantive rules are developed and applied. 3
These arbitrations are more than expedient attempts to resolve a particular
controversy; they are embedded in a much larger communal infrastructure and
incorporate shared values into the selected method of dispute resolution.'
Thus, Owen Fiss's famous argument that a judge has a unique role to play be-
cause "he is a public officer; paid for by public funds; chosen not by the parties
but by the public or its representatives; and empowered by the political agen-
cies to enforce and create society-wide norms,"" has a parallel in religious arbi-
tration: these arbitrators have a unique role to play because they are religious
authorities applying religious law and are thereby instructed to elaborate on
fundamental religious values shared by the parties.
Identifying the counter-narrative exemplified by religious arbitration pro-
vides important lessons for how courts should approach questions of arbitra-
tion doctrine more generally. While parties select arbitration largely because it
provides a more expedient form of dispute resolution, courts must still recog-
nize that arbitration is not a one-size-fits-all category; this is a conclusion high-
lighted by, but not exclusive to, religious arbitration. Parties enter arbitral fora
hoping to achieve a wide and diverse range of objectives. To properly adjudi-
cate cases, and to encourage new forms of arbitration that similarly promote
alternative values, courts must develop doctrine that better reflects arbitration's
varied nature.
Accordingly, courts should not continue unreflectively extending rules ap-
plicable in litigation to arbitration on the assumption that arbitration is simply,
like litigation, a form of judicial proceeding. Rather, courts need to evaluate
whether each particular arbitral forum is designed to substitute for litigation or
whether it is designed to promote other fundamental values.
Moreover, failing to distinguish between the fundamentally distinct objec-
tives of different forms of arbitration can lead to inadequate protection for par-
ties to the arbitration. Some arbitration agreements -geared towards achieving
13. See infra Part II.
14. See generally Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiat-
ing Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231 (2011).
15. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. 1.
REv. 1, 30-31 (1979).
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shared values - are embedded within a larger communal and religious net-
work; in such circumstances, common law contract defenses must account for
communal dynamics that can threaten the full exercise of unfettered consent
when entering arbitration agreements -otherwise they will leave vulnerable
parties without the necessary legal tools to enforce their rights.
In the end, the core lesson of arbitration's counter-narrative is that arbitra-
tion can augment a range of values. Recognizing this core lesson is necessary if
the law is to secure the best arbitration has to offer while simultaneously pro-
tecting those vulnerable to its excesses. The argument that follows will hope-
fully serve as a corrective, shifting our attention towards arbitration's counter-
narrative. It will proceed in three parts. Part I will provide additional back-
ground on arbitration's standard narrative. Part II will explore this counter-
narrative, using religious arbitration to demonstrate how arbitration can some-
times be organized around an alternative set of objectives. Part III will then
consider how judicial focus on the standard narrative has led to doctrinal de-
velopments ill-suited to the diversity of values that arbitration promotes, limit-
ing the ability of arbitration to leverage its jurisgenerative potential.
I. ARBITRATION'S NARRATIVE
The standard arbitration narrative, embraced by judges and scholars alike,
sees modern arbitration law as trying to answer the following question: when
it comes to resolving disputes, can arbitration serve as a viable alternative to lit-
igation ?16
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), courts believed
the answer to this question was no, and so they refused to enforce executory
arbitration agreements.' 7 Even subsequent to the passage of the FAA, the Su-
preme Court's answer to the question was only a tepid yes. The Court still be-
16. See Markovits, supra note i, at 431 n.1, 433.
17. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 51o n.4 (1974) ("English courts traditionally
considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the courts of jurisdiction, and re-
fused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by American courts
as part of the common law up to the time of the adoption of the Arbitration Act."); H.R.
REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) ("The need for the law arises from.., the jealousy of the Eng-
lish courts for their own jurisdiction.... This jealousy survived for so long a period that the
principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by
the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be
overturned without legislative enactment .... ). But see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBI-
TRATION LAW 19 (1992) (arguing that "contrary to modern folklore.., the premodern statu-
tory law of arbitration was largely supportive of that institution, as was the common law.").
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lieved arbitrators, in contrast to judges," were ill-equipped to resolve complex
disputes - most notably, those implicating federal statutory claims - and there-
fore worried that arbitrators would issue final awards that failed to apply the
law accurately and could not be corrected by subsequent judicial review."
But over the past three decades, the Supreme Court's answer to this fun-
damental question has morphed into an unequivocal and emphatic yes. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has now wholeheartedly endorsed arbitration, consistently
shielding arbitration agreements and awards from innumerable legal challeng-
es. On this new view, arbitrators are no longer seen as less capable of applying
complex legal rules than their counterparts in the judiciary.2" Instead, parties'
decision to opt out of the judicial process and select arbitration amounts to a
voluntary choice to "forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the
courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs,
greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to re-
solve specialized disputes."' Arbitration serves as a worthy alternative to litiga-
tion, on this view, because it provides "efficient" and "streamlined" proce-
dures' and thereby reaches far more "expeditious results."'23 Accordingly, "the
recognition that arbitration procedures are more streamlined than federal liti-
gation is not a basis for finding the forum somehow inadequate; the relative
informality of arbitration is one of the chief values in arbitration. '
18. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) ("Even though the provisions of the Secu-
rities Act, advantageous to the buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in
arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings.").
ig. See, e.g., id. at 435-36 (refusing to enforce an agreement to arbitrate claims under the 1933
Securities Act); see also CHRISTOPHER DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 191 n.1 ( 3d ed. 2013) (collecting federal courts of appeals relying on Wilko v.
Swan).
20. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) ("[A]rbitral tribunals are
readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwith-
standing the absence of judicial instruction and supervision.").
21. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (201O).
22. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011).
23. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357 (2008) ("A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate
is to achieve 'streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.' (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985))); see also Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. at 1749 (noting that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), "encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute
resolution" is one the goals of the FAA).
24. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 28o (1995) (collecting legislative history).
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This new-and far more confident-vision of arbitration has informed the
Court's overhaul of its arbitration jurisprudence, leading it to expand the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements and awards. In contrast with the law un-
der the Court's early decisionss therefore, parties now may submit disputes
implicating federal statutory rights to arbitration, even when the underlying
statute includes a provision explicitly prohibiting waiver of those rights. 6 Par-
ties can also submit the very enforceability of an arbitration agreement to arbi-
tration, circumventing judicial review of the agreement even when claims that
the agreement is unconscionable persist.27 In fact, the Supreme Court has en-
forced arbitration agreements that include class arbitration waivers, preempt-
ing state court decisions that had invoked the presence of such a waiver to
deem the arbitration agreement unconscionable. Moreover, the Court has re-
fused to invalidate arbitration agreements with class action waivers even when
those waivers make marshaling evidence to support federal statutory claims
economically unfeasible.29 And in addition to bolstering the enforceability of
arbitration agreements, the Court has further narrowed the grounds for vacat-
ing arbitration awards, holding that the FAA's statutory grounds provide the
exclusive grounds for reversing awards even when parties agree by contract to
enlarge that list."
This new vision of arbitration has also led the Court to reconsider its
longstanding distinction between commercial arbitration and labor arbitra-
tion.3' In a number of earlier decisions, the Court had emphasized that because
collective bargaining agreements inherently entail a "majoritarian process[],"
they cannot require employees to arbitrate claims predicated on an individual's
25. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
26. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
27. See Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 69 (2010). To be sure, questions of en-
forceability do not include questions about whether the parties in fact consented to the un-
derlying agreement. See BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206 (2014)
(describing which questions of arbitrability remain for the court).
28. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
29. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
30. Hall St. Assocs., LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,584-89 (2008).
31. See, e.g., Allison Anderson, Note, Labor and Commercial Arbitration: The Court's Misguided
Merger, 36 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 1237, 1263 (2013) ("The Pyett decision suggests that a
merger between labor arbitration law and commercial arbitration law is well underway.").
While standard commercial arbitration is governed by the FAA, labor arbitration has histor-
ically been governed by the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA). See Mitchell H.
Rubinstein, Altering Judicial Review of Labor Arbitrations Awards, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 235,
256-63 (describing the legal development of arbitration under the LMRA).
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statutory rights.32 But this distinction between labor arbitration and commer-
cial arbitration has been largely eliminated as the Court has increasingly con-
ceptualized arbitration as a homogenous dispute resolution mechanism. Thus,
in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Court has ex-
plained that "[n] othing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of
arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to
by a union representative."33 And the Court has further emphasized that con-
cerns over the ability of arbitration -even arbitration conducted pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement -to adequately protect the statutory rights of
claimants emanates from an outdated distrust of arbitration that was discarded
long ago. 4
Not surprisingly, the Court's growing confidence in arbitration's ability to
serve as an alternative to litigation has triggered vociferous backlash from
scholars. At the center of this criticism is a fundamental worry that arbitration
agreements often fail to represent a considered decision of both parties to forgo
litigation." On this view, some parties find themselves subject to the procedur-
32. E.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) ("Title VII, on the other hand,
stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individu-
al's right to equal employment opportunities."); see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981) ("[D]ifferent considerations apply where the employee's
claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive
guarantees to individual workers.").
33. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 258 (2009); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (compelling arbitration of an age discrimination claim pur-
suant to the terms of an arbitration agreement).
34. Pyett, 556 U.S. at 267 ("Indeed, in light of the 'radical change, over two decades, in the
Court's receptivity to arbitration,' . . . reliance on any judicial decision similarly littered with
Wilko's overt hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements would be ill advised."
(quoting Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,77 (1998))).
35. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage Firms
Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 415, 447 (2003) ("[C]ustomers do not have a
choice about what to do with this information [regarding arbitration] because every broker-
age firm requires its customers to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of opening an
account."); Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Im-
portance of Volition, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 1o5, 164 (1997) ("[A]rbitration is sometimes not truly
the product of free choice."); Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provi-
sions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37, 47 (2007) ("Choice and consent to remedy limitations have become le-
gal fictions in consumer form contracts . . . ."); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
637, 679-80 (1996) (describing how arbitration can be imposed on consumers through form
contracts, which serve the interests of companies and give them an unfair advantage). For a
discussion of how the rise of boilerplate language in contracts has eroded elements of con-
sent more broadly, see generally Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modu-
larity and the Waning of Consent, in BoILE.PLArE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS
189 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
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al uncertainties of arbitration without truly waiving their right to pursue litiga-
tion. Indeed, those skeptical of whether parties truly consent to arbitration note
that an overwhelming majority of arbitrations are conducted pursuant to pre-
dispute arbitration provisions. 6 Thus, for example, employees and consumers
who sign employment or purchase agreements will often consent to waiving
their statutory rights where the prospect of a dispute is sufficiently far off that
their concerns over securing the job or purchasing the particular product are
significantly more pressing.37
The problems of consent are particularly worrisome, according to critics,
because arbitration provisions are generally deployed by institutional actors.
These institutional actors, the claim goes, are able to leverage their superior
bargaining position to insulate themselves from liability by shielding their
conduct from meaningful judicial scrutiny and review. Moreover, arbitration
36. See, e.g., Meredith R. Miller, Contracting Out of Process, Contracting Out of Corporate Account-
ability: An Argument Against Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 TENN. L. REV.
365, 400 (2008) ("The potential for corporate abuse of express, pre-dispute limitations is
compounded by the fact that the vast majority of arbitration clauses are contained in con-
tracts of adhesion, which bear little resemblance to the voluntary agreements envisioned
when one thinks of 'consent.'" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, S7 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1649 (2005) ("In
short, under most reasonable definitions mandatory arbitration is nonconsensual, given that
consumers and employees don't typically read or understand the clauses."); see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat
Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19, 32-33 (1999) (discussing how various
companies make pre-dispute arbitration agreements a condition for employment, services,
or sale of a good); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convolut-
ed Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1o85, 1105 (2002) ("[W]hen the opportunity for bargaining is not realistically
present ... the coercive aspect of [pre-litigation agreements] makes them seem less a mech-
anism for efficient resolution of disputes and more a potential tool for gaining strategic ad-
vantage.").
37. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REv. 449, 453 (1996)
(arguing that many employees undervalue the presence of arbitration clauses because they
underestimate the probability that a dispute will occur); Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer
Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 627, 660
(20o8) ("[C]ompanies insist on pre-dispute arbitration clauses because consumers are un-
likely to agree to arbitration after disputes arise due to adversarial postures and growing dis-
trust of arbitration.").
38. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013) (Kagan, J., dis-
senting) ("Applied as our precedents direct, the effective-vindication rule furthers the pur-
poses not just of laws like the Sherman Act, but of the FAA itself. That statute reflects a fed-
eral policy favoring actual arbitration- that is, arbitration as a streamlined 'method of
resolving disputes,' not as a foolproof way of killing off valid claims .... Put otherwise:
What the FAA prefers to litigation is arbitration, not defacto immunity."); Levin, supra note
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provisions are sometimes used in tandem with class-arbitration waivers, ena-
bling corporations to kill off class-action lawsuits and thereby ensure that
small-money plaintiffs lack the incentives to bring suit for various forms of
widespread - but low-cost - malfeasance.39
Furthermore, some critics contend that arbitration proceedings themselves
are structurally skewed to favor the corporate repeat player who not only holds
informational advantages over the one-shot plaintiff,40 but also implicitly holds
35, at 125-34 (discussing the reluctance of most courts to review arbitration decisions for er-
rors of law).
39. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHi. L. REv. 623, 627 (2012) ("And then there is the
coup de grace administered to consumer class actions by a 5-4 Supreme Court this past term
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. All of the doctrinal developments of recent years cir-
cumscribing the reach of class actions pale in import next to the game-changing edict that
companies ... may simply opt out of potential liability by incorporating class action waiver
language in their standard form contracts with consumers (or employees or others)."); Ju-
dith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARv. L. REv. 78, 133 (2011) ("The providers won the power to
impose a mandatory, no-opt-out system in their own private 'courts' designed to preclude
aggregate litigation."); Sternlight, supra note 35, at 683 ("[C]ompan[ies] might seek to pre-
vent consumers from joining together in a class action, thereby forcing each plaintiff to bear
the full burden of litigation costs on her own. Often, suits that cannot be brought as a class
action cannot economically be brought at all."); J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconsciona-
bility: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1747
(2006) ("[B]y prohibiting class actions in the context of 'negative-value' lawsuits, where the
expected recovery is dwarfed by the cost of litigating or arbitrating the claim, individuals are
effectively prevented from pursuing their claims. As a result, businesses are able to engage in
unchecked market misbehavior that results in small and seemingly insignificant conse-
quences upon individuals, but which leads to sizeable windfalls for the particular corpora-
tion in the aggregate."); Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waiv-
ers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need forA Judicial Standard, 45 Hous. L. REv. 215,
250 (2008) ("[A]s most consumer advocates point out, and the courts are beginning to rec-
ognize, these class action waivers show up in transactions in which the consumer has no re-
alistic option of turning away.").
40. Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Re-
view of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223, 238-39 (1998) (discuss-
ing statistics showing that repeat players are more successful in arbitration); Edward
Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1459, 1493
(1996) ("In securities arbitration there is no real consent to arbitrate and, on the part of the
typical investor, no understanding of the nature of the arbitral process."); Miller, supra note
36, at 400 (" [C]orporations that draft arbitration clauses into their standardized agreements
are usually in a position of superior bargaining power, with a wider knowledge of the intri-
cacies of the deal and the potential disputes that might arise."); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Com-
pelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 69 ("The parties also have disparate knowledge, be-
cause the drafting party understands the nature of potential future disputes and the differ-
ences between arbitration and litigation, whereas the adherent does not.").
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out the carrot of more business for the arbitrator if the current dispute is re-
solved in accordance with the corporate defendant's expectations. 4' These
asymmetries are particularly troubling, critics argue, given that the Supreme
Court has erased nearly all limits on which disputes can be arbitrated.42 At the
same time, arbitration proceedings lack the procedural safeguards of judicial
proceedings, further undermining the likelihood of arbitral justice, especially
for those unfamiliar with the ins and outs of arbitration.43 In this way, the deci-
sion to embrace the "procedural informality" of arbitration is problematic not
only because of the uneven nature of consent, but also because the claimed ad-
vantages of arbitration - speed and efficiency - do not actually inure to the ben-
efit of all parties.
To be sure, plenty of arbitration's defenders emphatically reject these char-
acterizations, arguing that arbitration does indeed serve as a viable alternative
to litigation.' These supporters view arbitration as largely volitional; 41 they
41. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolu-
tion and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 1o67 (2000) (suggesting that "self-serving
motives, such as greed, can easily be hypothesized" to explain the empirical data showing a
favor towards repeat players in arbitration); see also Cole, supra note 37, at 478 ("Economic
coercion clearly plays some role in a system where an arbitrator who regularly finds in favor
of complaining employees may expect that the employer will be reluctant to rehire him in
the future.").
42. Julie K. Bracker & Larry D. Soderquist, Arbitration in the Corporate Context, 2003 COLUM.
Bus. L. REy. 1, 29 ("[T) he Court is taking the 'federal presumption in favor of arbitration' to
its extreme and will broadly construe the FAA to reach virtually all contracts."); Thomas E.
Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 7o TUL. L. REv.
1945, 1952 (1996) (describing the Supreme Court's arbitration rulings as a "march toward a
wide and boundary-less concept of arbitration"); Schwartz, supra note 40, at 36, 81-103 (ar-
guing that "[t]he Supreme Court has created a monster[;] [w]ith the Court's enthusiastic
approval, pre-dispute arbitration clauses-agreements to submit future disputes to binding
arbitration-have increasingly found their way into standard form contracts of adhesion"
and discussing the ways in which the Supreme Court's view of the FAA creates a "sphere in
which arbitration agreements are almost entirely free from the fairness and public policy
limitations placed on adhesion contracts generally").
43. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81, 102 (1992)
("The orthodox view holds that parties who consent by contract to arbitration expressly
waive their constitutional rights. The parties opt out of the judicial system with its rigid
substantive rules. This view relieves the arbitrator of any obligation to consider constitu-
tional assertions in the arbitration proceeding.").
44. See Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 329 (2005) (arguing that
arbitration provides an equitable alternative to the often sclerotic mode of litigation to re-
cover justice, partly because arbitration saves time and money, offers procedural flexibility,
substantive flexibility, and sensitivity to community norms, and can be tailored to the spe-
cifics of the dispute); Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the
Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008) (criticizing congressional
findings that arbitration agreements undermine consumer choice, pressure arbitration com-
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provide strong reasons to wonder whether concerns that arbitration is skewed
in favor of the repeat player are misguided; 46 they note that the plaintiffs bar
has helped counteract the informational imbalance that might otherwise be ex-
perienced by one-shot parties to arbitration;47 and they also highlight the way
panies to favor repeat players, undermine the development of public law, provide a poor re-
course for the protection of civil rights, and that arbitrations often are tilted against individ-
uals in favor of corporations).
45. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REv. 1
(providing empirical data supporting the proposition that arbitration clauses are generally
much more favorable to consumers than their critics make them out to be); Thomas
Stipanowich, Arbitration And Choice: Taking Charge of The "New Litigation," 7 DEPAUL Bus.
& COMM. L.J. 383, 436 (2009) ("Choice-the opportunity to tailor procedures to business
goals and priorities- is the fundamental advantage of arbitration over litigation. The free-
dom to choose, and key resulting differences between contract-based arbitration and court
trial, explain why most business users prefer arbitration when resolving commercial dis-
putes."); Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitu-
tional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 40-41 (2003) (criticizing some commentators'
decision to refer to pre-dispute arbitration agreements as "mandatory" when the agreements
are voluntarily accepted); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REv. 83, 160 (1996) (arguing that commentators' criticism that arbitration
agreements in the employment context lack voluntariness are largely overblown and that in
the absence of the separability doctrine, duties to arbitrate are, "like all [duties] enforced by
contract law," voluntarily assumed).
46. Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the
Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1059 (2009) (criticizing a Public Citizen report's
claims that the repeat player effect is one of the major problems with arbitration by inter-
preting available empirical data and concluding that "the data does not necessarily support
the Report's strident conclusions"); Rutledge, supra note 44, at 268-78; David Sherwyn et
al., Assessing the Casefor Employment Arbitration: A New Pathfor Empirical Research, 57 STAN.
L. REv. 1557 (2005) (suggesting that various critics' accusation that repeat players have an
advantage because they can curry favor as "repeat customers" may incorrectly conceptualize
repeat players' advantage and that instead their advantage arises from the fact that the re-
peat players have greater experience in the arbitration process); Stephen J. Ware, The Effects
of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST.
J. Disp. RESOL. 735, 751-53 (2001) (reviewing Lisa Bingham's empirical studies on the "repeat
player effect" and concluding that once one controls for the merits of the employment dis-
pute, the presence of a repeat player may make no difference at all).
47. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2OOl U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 751
("Even for individuals who are not fully informed.., repeat-player bias may be less of a
problem than some critics suggest. Although individuals are not repeat players, their attor-
neys may well be. Plaintiffs' attorneys may represent numerous employees, franchisees, or
consumers against corporate defendants, effectively becoming repeat players."); Samuel Es-
treicher, Predispute Agreements To Arbitrate Statutory Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1355
(1997) ("Moreover, the real repeat players will be the lawyers for both defense and plaintiff
bars in the area ... who can be counted on to share information within their group about
the track records of proposed arbitrators."); William B. Gould, IV, Kissing Cousins?: The
Federal Arbitration Act and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 617 (2006) ("The
plaintiffs' bar representing employees is emerging as an institutional force with which to be
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in which arbitration service providers have created procedural rules to provide
for predictability in everything from arbitrator selection to discovery. 48 In sum,
arbitration advocates claim that the problems in arbitration are much less dire
than they are made to seem and that, in fact, arbitration is appropriately fa-
vored because it provides a cheaper, faster, and thus potentially superior alter-
native to adjudication in court.49
But notwithstanding the divide between arbitration's advocates and critics,
both groups assess arbitration from a similar vantage point: they evaluate arbi-
tration by determining whether it allows for the fair and equitable resolution of
disputes. In this way, advocates and critics focus on the dispute resolution
function of arbitration, comparing it-either implicitly or explicitly-to the ju-
dicial process. Critics see arbitration as a second-best alternative to litigation,
arguing that is plagued by two fundamental flaws: it is often conducted with-
out the true consent of the parties and it fails to live up to the standards of the
judicial process. Advocates argue that arbitration provides a fair and equitable
alternative to litigation and that, to the extent arbitration provides more lim-
ited protections than the judicial process, the speed and efficiency of the arbi-
tration make the trade-off well worth it. But for both, arbitration and judicial
reckoned. In some circumstances, plaintiffs' attorneys have networks rivaling those of labor
unions in labor-management arbitration; these networks can provide intelligence on the
competence and impartiality of selected neutrals."); Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory
Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77, 97-99 (1996) ("[A]
plaintiffs' bar is the most likely institutional repeat player to balance the employers' presence
in arbitration.").
48. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Behind the Neutral: A Look at Provider Issues, in AAA HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCiAL ARBITRATION 83 (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette A. Jaeggi eds., 2006)
(explaining the importance of provider institution rules to the arbitration process and the
manner in which provider institutions throughout the world have collectively contributed to
the development of recognized procedural standards); J. Timothy Eaton & Patricia S.
Spratt, Discovery in Arbitrations, CBA REC., Nov. 2009, at 34 (arguing that discovery proce-
dures can be built into the arbitration process).
4g. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge, CATO INST.
4-5 (2002), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa433.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6QZH-FGUC] ("Parties using arbitration generally find that it saves them time and money
in comparison with litigation. Arbitration is typically quick, inexpensive, and confidential. It
generally operates in a commonsense way, without all of the legal jargon and procedural
maneuvering that go on in court."); 9f MACNEIL ET AL., supra note i, § 2.6.2, at 2:41 ("In
sum, arbitration is a form of consensual, relatively informal, personalized adjudication
where the primary objective is to obtain less expensive justice between the parties. The chal-
lenge is to obtain particularized justice in an extra-legal adjudicatory process with potential
strengths and weaknesses when compared to civil litigation.").
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proceedings fundamentally serve the same primary function: resolving dis-
putes.5 o
This shared conceptual framework has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, a
number of scholars have contended that the basic assumption that courts are
simply intended to resolve disputes misses how courts are also meant to serve
as institutions that promote core public values. Thus, these scholars argue, a
wholesale movement away from courts and towards arbitration would erode
core public values that are advanced by judicial resolution of disputes. On this
view- most directly associated with the work of Owen Fiss5' and Judith Res-
nik 2 - the encroachment of alternative dispute resolution, including settlement
and arbitration proceedings, deprives the public of vital first-order values unre-
lated to the dispute-resolution objectives of the parties. Thus Fiss has argued
that the job of judges "is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simp-
ly to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in
authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those val-
ues and to bring reality into accord with them.""3 Similarly, Resnik has lament-
ed the decline of adjudication, which aspired to ensure fairness and impartiali-
ty, with disinterested judges providing "reasoned explanations of their deci-
decisions ... without concern for the interest of particular constituencies. '54
On this view, the focus of adjudication is on the public and its relationship
to the law -a focus at odds with arbitration's attempt to simply provide the
parties with an alternative dispute resolution forum. Indeed, following Fiss and
Resnik, others have emphasized that this public-values worry (that is, the need
for courts to define, promote, and enhance fundamental legal values through
so. See, e.g., MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 1, § 2.6.2, at 2:37-38 (" [T]he purpose of both forms is to
obtain justice between the parties through a final decision on the merits by the arbitrator or
the judge.").
Si. Fiss, supra note 15, at 30-31 ("Arbitrators are paid for by the parties; chosen by the parties;
and enjoined by a set of practices (such as a reluctance to write opinions or generate prece-
dents) that localizes or privatizes the decision. The function of the arbitrator is to resolve a
dispute. The function of the judge, on the other hand, must be understood in wholly differ-
ent terms: he is a public officer; paid for by public funds; chosen not by the parties but by
the public or its representatives; and empowered by the political agencies to enforce and cre-
ate society-wide norms, and perhaps even to restructure institutions, as a way, I suggest, of
giving meaning to our public values.").
s2. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 3 U. CHI. L. REv.
494 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 445 (1982) [hereinafter
Resnik, Managerial Judges].
53. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, io85 (1984).
54. Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 52, at 445; see also Edward Brunet, Questioning the
Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1987) (discussing the Fiss and
Resnik arguments as well as other arguments in a similar vein).
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their decisions) has become increasingly acute now that the Supreme Court has
allowed a wide range of federal statutory claims to be submitted to arbitra-
tion."
But while the public-values critique challenges the standard narrative, it
does so by concluding that there is more at stake in litigation than mere dispute
resolution. The public-values critique does not challenge the fundamental as-
sumption that arbitration is mainly about dispute resolution. In this way, the
standard view of arbitration has become entrenched not only in Supreme Court
doctrine, but also in the conceptual framework embraced by a wide range of
scholars. On these accounts, parties select arbitration for one reason alone: to
resolve disputes.
II. ARBITRATION'S COUNTER-NARRATIVE
At the core of the standard arbitration narrative is a vision of arbitration as
an alternative method for resolving disputes. The arguments typically mar-
shaled in favor of arbitration therefore focus on the idea that arbitration is effi-
cient, streamlined, and cheaper than litigation.s6 Indeed, none of this is sur-
prising. Surveys of corporations consistently report that saving time and saving
money are some of those corporations' most important reasons for choosing
arbitration. 7 These considerations appear to have also, in part, motivated Con-
gress to pass the FAA in 1925.58
55. See, e.g., Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the
Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1059 (1987) (criticizing the Supreme Court's arbi-
trability doctrine for authorizing the arbitration of federal statutory claims aimed to protect
public interests).
56. See supra notes 21-24.
57. See, e.g., David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate Dis-
putes: A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations, CORNEI2/PERC INST.
ON CONFLICT RESOL. (1998), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgVviewcontent.cgi
?article= 1003&context=icrpubs [http://perma.cc/FVTs-6DGL]; Douglas Shontz et al.,
Business-to-Business Arbitration in the United States: Perceptions of Corporate Counsel,
RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST. (2o11), http://www.rand.org/content/dan/rand/pubs/technical
_reports/2011/RANDTR781.pdf [http://perma.cc/57YK-RX6K]; see also Thomas J.
Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation,
Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune looo Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1
(2014) (using recent survey date to identify new trends in the approach of corporations to
arbitration and other methods of alternative dispute resolution).
58. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995) (citing to portions of the
FAA's legislative history); see also H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982) (discussing a proposed
patent arbitration scheme and arguing that "[t]he advantages of arbitration are many: it is
usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and evidentiary
rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business
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But while the standard arbitration narrative has strong foundations, it fails
to account for alternative conceptions of the practice - conceptions that coalesce
into an arbitral counter-narrative - that aim to achieve a wholly different set of
objectives. On this count, the transformative potential of arbitration has been
largely underappreciated; arbitration provides a framework within which par-
ties can opt out of the dominant legal system and establish their own rules and
procedures to govern the dispute resolution process. And parties can tap into
this transformative potential by employing arbitration and choice-of-law pro-
visions that ultimately advance a shared set of objectives and values.
While these values-driven modes of arbitration are undoubtedly used less
frequently than standard forms of arbitration, they play a prominent role in a
wide range of arbitral fora. 9 In the commercial sphere, a number of industries
and trade associations have adopted methods of arbitration that are intended to
amplify shared values and relational objectives. Perhaps the most famous ex-
ample is the diamond industry,6° but there are numerous others, 6, including
the construction industry, where "parties ... are continually building relation-
ships ",62 and have embraced a dispute resolution system that reflects the shared
sense of "inherent duty to abide by their promises and treat one another fair-
ly."63 Members of these industries, in turn, "generally understand and accept
industry norms [and] standards." 6' This emphasis on shared values has also
played a prominent role in labor arbitration, where parties have looked to arbi-
dealings among the parties; it is often more flexible in regard to scheduling of times and
places of hearings and discovery devices ....
59. See Markovits, supra note 1, at 473.
6o. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 383, 407 (2006) (noting that within
the diamond industry, parties seek to promote "adherence to values that have religious sig-
nificance to the community"). On enforcement of community norms in the diamond indus-
try, see generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Rela-
tions in the Diamond Industty, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
61. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Assimilation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1053, 1057 (1999) (not-
ing that "[c]urrent arbitration can usefully be divided into two types: intra-group arbitra-
tion and general arbitration" and providing examples of commercial intra-group arbitra-
tion).
62. Schmitz, supra note 8, at 158.
63. Id. at 155. In this way, the construction industry prizes relational values even where promot-
ing those values might require parties to perform on contracts that they otherwise would
disavow. Schmitz identifies sports arbitration as another example of what she describes as
"intra communal" arbitration. See id. at 149-50.
64. Id. at 158.
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tration as a process capable of improving the working relationship between la-
bor and management.6 s
The transformative potential of arbitration has been further magnified in
the various family law contexts. From division of assets to child custody to
wills and trusts, courts and commentators have noted ways in which arbitra-
tion can allow parties to select a process of dispute resolution that ensures sen-
sitive decisions reflect personal family values and ideals.66 Thus, subjecting
disputes over a testamentary gift to arbitration can.ensure not only the privacy
of deeply personal family matters, but it can also provide a degree of "testa-
mentary freedom" to the testator by allowing him to establish a process of dis-
pute resolution that reflects his own personal-even if nonconforming-
values.67 Similarly, some have endorsed arbitrating child custody disputes in
particular cases because doing so would allow parties to select a process of dis-
pute resolution reflecting even non-majoritarian family structures. They argue
that such a process would allow parties to be more comfortable during the pro-
ceeding with a higher likelihood that a decision will ultimately satisfy the par-
ties.68 And although the legal doctrine addressing the arbitrability of various
family law claims is deeply uncertain,69 it is far from surprising that many
65. See Abrams et. al., supra note 8, at 1759-6o; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (196o) ("The courts... have no business weighing the merits of the
grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether
there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim.... The
processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not
a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware." (footnote omitted)).
66. See Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 BROOK. L. REv.
791, 813 (2010) ("Arbitration, like personal law, results in family law pluralism. However,
arbitration differs from personal law in that the family law pluralism that results in a per-
sonal law system is (arguably) more dependent on, and more the creation of, the state. Arbi-
tration, on the other hand, is imagined as existing 'outside' of the state, and as providing an
'alternative' to the state's monolithic rules. In this way, arbitration potentially allows for
even greater family law pluralism than a personal law system does, as the potential variation
in family law rules corresponds to the (larger) diversity found amongst cognizable couples
(as opposed to cognizable communities) in society.").
67. Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 8, at 294-97.
68. See Spitko, Judge Not, supra note 8, at lO81-83. But see Burgess C. Bradshaw, Comment,
LGBT Parents- Where Do Their Child Custody Disputes Belong?, 5 J. AM. ARB. 405 (2006) (ar-
guing that changes in family law in recent years have obviated the need for resorting to
ADR).
69. See Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347 (N.J. 2009) (describing the wide range of judicial and
scholarly views on the arbitrability of child custody disputes and adopting a standard allow-
ing for their arbitrability on the condition that a "record of all documentary evidence ad-
duced during the arbitration proceedings be kept; that testimony be recorded; and that the
arbitrator issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in respect of the award of custody
and parenting time"); David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instru-
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scholars have seen arbitration as providing an important dispute resolution al-
ternative for members of the LGBT community' who continue to see the
dominant legal system as insufficiently attentive to and accommodating of
their needs and values.7'
What these counter-narrative forms of arbitration have in common is that
parties select them because the forum promotes the values they share, not be-
cause it serves as an expedient alternative to litigation. The origin and nature of
the values at stake, of course, vary significantly. They range from commercial
norms that have evolved within a particular trade association, to ideological
commitments within a particular family, to relational values that protect the
interpersonal bonds within a tightly knit industry, to rules that have been
adopted by a particular religious community.
To safeguard these values, different groups will employ different methods.
Some groups may use arbitrator qualification provisions to ensure that the ar-
bitrator is familiar with the parties' shared values;7' some may use forum selec-
tion clauses to authorize an arbitration employing procedural rules that reflect
the parties' commitments ;' yet others may use choice-of-law provisions to en-
sure that the arbitration proceedings are conducted in accordance with rules
that reflect the parties' shared values.74 But in all such cases, arbitration is se-
lected for its transformative potential -its ability to serve not as a forum of
mere expediency, but rather as a forum that can be infused with the procedures
ments, 9o N.C. L. REv. 1027 (2012) (describing the wide variances in judicial application of
state arbitration acts to testamentary instruments).
70. See, e.g., June Carbone, Marriage as a State of Mind: Federalism, Contract, and the Expressive
Interest in Family Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 49, 53 (noting that "partners could incorporate
compulsory arbitration provisions that allow them to select gay-friendly decision-makers to
resolve future disputes").
71. See, e.g., Todd Brower, Multistable Figures: Sexual Orientation Visibility and Its Effects on the
Experiences of Sexual Minorities in the Courts, 27 PACE L. REV. 141 (2007); see also Freshman,
supra note 8, at 1719 ("Many accounts of gay and lesbian couples detail horrible, homopho-
bic-sounding court decisions.").
72. See Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 8, at 294-97 (arguing that a testator should
select an arbitrator to resolve disputes regarding his estate plan who is familiar with his
"values and beliefs" underlying the estate plan); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary
Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REv. 1145, 1233-35 (2004) (arguing that
selecting an arbitrator who understands the parties' culture is acceptable, particularly when
the parties have consented to the selection).
73. See Helfand, supra note 14, at 1264-66 (discussing procedural rules under Jewish and Islamic
law arbitrations).
74. In this way, intra-community dispute resolution can function as a practice that perpetuates
communal values. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY 181-203 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the interactions between social institutions and
practices and the structure of communal values).
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and commitments that promote the shared values and aspirations of the par-
ties.75
The arbitration framework is particularly important when parties aim to
incorporate community or group values into their own dispute resolution pro-
cess. Arbitration allows parties to make individual decisions regarding the
structure of the arbitral forum; they can, as a matter of contract, decide which
rules will apply and what type of individuals will be charged with applying
those rules. This flexibility operates as an open invitation to bring community
and group norms into the dispute resolution forum. This process operates in
reverse as well, with the arbitration itself becoming integrated into a group or
community's infrastructure. Of course, this remains true only so long as courts
vigorously police consent to such agreements, a concern to which we will re-
turn below.76 In sum, these forms of arbitration provide parties with a mecha-
nism to recognize their shared identities and affiliations while, ideally, ensur-
ing that those identities and affiliations are not merely imposed from the
outside.'
The paradigmatic example of this counter-narrative is religious arbitra-
tion, 7 where parties seek not only to resolve a dispute, but also to have that
dispute adjudicated in accordance with religious law and to have that law ap-
plied by mutually agreed upon religious authorities. 9 To achieve these objec-
75. Cf. Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming, supra note 8, at 275 ("In a variety of contexts, cultural
minorities have cause to fear adjudication of their legal rights and responsibilities in a legal
system dominated by majority-culture personnel (most notably including judges and ju-
rors)." (footnote omitted)).
76. See infra Part III.B.
77. It is for these reasons that I have argued elsewhere for an arbitration-based conceptualiza-
tion of the "church autonomy" doctrine, which is also consistent with the Supreme Court's
initial articulation of the concept. See Michael A. Helfand, Religion's Footnote Four: Church
Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013).
78. Not surprisingly, there has been a recent increase in scholarly investigation of religious arbi-
tration. See, e.g., Farrah Ahmed & Senwung Luk, How Religious Arbitration Could Enhance
Personal Autonomy, 1 OxFoRD J.L. & RELIGION 424 (2012); Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Au-
thority: Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration, 37 VT. L. REV. 157 (2012); Helfand, supra note
14; Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 5O (2012); Michael C. Grossman, Note, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judi-
cial Review, and Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (2007); Caryn Litt Wolfe, Note, Faith-
Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Inter-
action with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (20o6); Yvonne Tew, Arbitrating God
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload documents
/Yvonne%2oTew/2o-%2oGlobal%2oFellows%2oForum-o.pdf [http ://perma.cc/X6BE-XK
9B].
79. Helfand, supra note 14, at 1243-52 (describing different forms of religious arbitration in the
United States).
124:2994 2015
THE RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION PARADIGM
tives, religious arbitration agreements will typically incorporate choice-of-law
provisions alongside arbitration provisions to guarantee that the proceedings
8,are conducted in accordance with the parties' shared religious practices.
In the United States, members of all three primary Abrahamic faith com-
munities employ forms of religious arbitration. 8' Likely the most well-known
of the three is the Jewish beit din or rabbinical courts2 The sense of obligation
within the Jewish community to resolve disputes before a rabbinical courts
stems from prevailing interpretations of Jewish Law. The obligation to submit
all disputes before a beit din - as opposed to secular courts - is detailed in the
Talmud and codified in the Code of Jewish Law.8' By adhering to this obliga-
tion, parties demonstrate their fidelity to the values and principles animating
the Jewish legal system; to violate this rule would be "tantamount to a declara-
tion by the litigant that he is amenable to allowing an alien code of law to su-
persede the law of the Torah."8"
8o. See, e.g., Beth Din Zedek Ecclesiastical Judicature, Binding Arbitration Agreement, CHI. RAB-
BINICAL COUNCIL, http://www.crcweb.org/BDA PS-1_3_%28Prenup%2oStandard%29.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7CMH-PU6J] ("The decision of the Beth Din shall be made in accordance
with Jewish law (halakha) or Beth Din ordered settlement in accordance with the principles
of Jewish law (peshara krova la-din) .... The parties waive their right to contest the juris-
diction or procedures of the Beth Din or the validity of this Agreement in any
other rabbinical court or arbitration forum. ... ); Forms and Publications, BETH DIN
Am. (2010), http://bethdin.org/forms-publications.asp [http://perma.cc/8WLJ-AWK5]
(providing standard forms for arbitration agreements and arbitration provisions in con-
tracts); Mediation/Arbitration, PEACEMAKER MINISTRIES (2015), http://peacemaker.net
/mediationarbitration [http://perma.cc/FNgD-VAYD] (form arbitration agreement incor-
porating the Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation, which state that "the Holy Scrip-
tures (the Bible) shall be the supreme authority governing every aspect of the conciliation
process"); Procedure Rules of Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, MUSLIM ARB. TRIBUNAL (2015),
http://www.matribunal.coni/rules.php [http://perma.cc/5A95-GsAT] (stating that disputes
are resolved "in accordance with Qur'anic Injunctions and Prophetic Practice as determined
by the recognized Schools of Islamic Sacred Law").
81. For a discussion of religious arbitration in the U.S. Jewish and Islamic communities, see
Helfand, supra note 14, at 1247-52.
82. For a thorough description of the beit din, see Ginnine Fried, Comment, The Collision of
Church and State: A Primer to Beth Din Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 633 (2004).
83. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD: TRACTATE GITTIN 88b (interpreting Exodus 21:1); JOSEPH KARO,
SHULCHAN ARUCH, CHOSHEN MISHPAT, 26:1; Yaacov Feit, The Prohibition Against Going to
Secular Courts, iJ. BETH DIN OF AM. 30 (2012).
84. J. David Bleich, Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature: Litigation and Arbitration Be-
fore Non-Jews, 34 TRADITION 58, 63-64 (2000) (characterizing one of two primary views of
the rationale behind the requirement); see also Yaacov Feit & Michael A. Helfand, Confirming
Piskei Din in Secular Court, 61 J. HA.AcHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y 5, 6-9 (2011) (describing the
rationale behind Jewish law's prohibition against submitting disputes to secular courts);
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As a result of these religious requirements, rabbinical courts have been es-
tablished across the United States, most frequently in large cities with signifi-
cant Jewish populations.8" Moreover, while statistics tracking the frequency of
rabbinical court arbitration are typically unavailable, the number of commercial
cases filed annually before the Beth Din of America-one of the most promi-
nent rabbinical courts in America-has nearly doubled over the past ten
years,86 providing a limited indication that the use of rabbinical arbitration is
on the rise in th6 United States.
Parallel forms of Islamic arbitration remain in a state of relative flux. Some
of the flux appears related to an ongoing debate within Islamic law as to
whether and to what extent Islamic law ought to be implemented by Muslim
minorities living in non-Muslim states. 87 Notwithstanding this debate, the
Qu'ran does provide ample basis for concluding that Muslims ought to submit
matters of dispute to religious authorities for adjudication.88 Indeed, as some
have noted, under Islamic Law, "laymen ... are under the obligation to follow
Michael A. Helfand, Beit Din's Gap-Filling Function: Using Beit Din To Protect Your Client, 2
J. BETH DIN OFAM. 31, 31-32 (2014) (same).
85. See, e.g., BETH DIN OF AM. (2010), http://www.bethdin.org [http://perma.cc/6AK3-3YLD]
(New York); CRC Beth Din, CHI. RABBINICAL COUNCIL (2015), http://www.crcweb.org
/bethdin.php [http://perma.cc/2zB4-FRUT] (Chicago); Beth Din, RABBINICAL COUNCIL
CAL. (20o6), http://rccvaad.org/bethdin [http://perma.cc/PNH3-NVVE] (Los Angeles).
86. According to Rabbi Shlomo Weissmann, Director of the Beth Din of America, the respective
numbers of civil cases filed for the past twelve years have been S6 in 2002, 68 in 2003, 70 in
2004, 85 in 2005, 86 in 2006, 98 in 2007, 11o in 2008, 94 in 2009, 107 in 2010, 118 in 2011
and 95 in 2012, 74 in 2013 and ioo in 2014. E-mail from Shlomo Weismann, Dir., Beth Din
of America, to author (Feb. 2, 2015, 12:51 EST) (on file with author) (providing data from
2011-2014); see also Helfand, supra note 14, at 1249 n.82 (2011) (providing data from 2002-
2010).
87. See Abdul Wahid Sheikh Osman, Islamic Arbitration Courts in America & Canada?, HIIRAAN
ONLINE (2005), http://www.hiiraan.com/op/eng/2oo5/dec/Prof Abdulwahid2112o 5.htm[http://perma.cc/UT8G-WUCB] ("The answer to the question whether Islam-sanctioned
Arbitration tribunals may be established in the West depends on another central question;
do the major schools of Sunni Shariah jurisprudence (the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Han-
bali schools), as well as the Shi'iteJafari school, actually reject the partial implementation of
Islamic law in non-Islamic jurisdiction?"); see also Mustafa R.K. Baig, Operating Islamic Ju-
risprudence In Non-Muslim Jurisdictions: Traditional Islamic Precepts and Contemporary Contro-
versies in the United States, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 79 (2015) (exploring the extent to which Is-
lamic law is applicable to Muslims in non-Muslim states); Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islamic Law
and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to
the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries, 1 ISLAMIC L. & SOC'Y 141, 172-81 (1994) (same).
88. See THE OuR'AN 4:59; 33:36 (M. A. S. Abdel Haleem trans., 2004); see also KHALED ABOU EL
FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD's NAME: IsLAMIC LAw, AUTHORITY AND WOMEN 30-40 (2001) (dis-
cussing the Qur'an's treatment of dispute resolution).
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the guidance of the mujtahids,"89 and laymen must adhere to the mujtahid's
"authority without questioning either his textual evidence or the line of reason-
ing he adopted in a particular case." 9°
Given these principles, it is not surprising that there have been a number of
attempts within the Muslim community in the past three decades to begin
building a larger Islamic arbitral system in the United States.9" And a number
of Islamic organizations have developed protocols, rules, and procedures for
use by Islamic arbitration panels in the United States.92 Importantly, this push
for Islamic arbitration in the United States flows from a shared religious belief
that Muslims ought to resolve their disputes in accordance with Islamic rules,
principles, and values. For example, Muzammil Siddiqi, Chairman of the Fiqh
Council of North America's Executive Committee has stated in a fatwa that
"Muslims must try their utmost to solve all their problems and disputes among
themselves and according to the laws of Allah Almighty." 93
89. WAEL B. HALLAOQA HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 122 (1997).
9
o
. WAEL B. HALLAQ, AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAW 86 (20O1); see gen-
erally id. at 86-12o (describing the concept of taqlid, or acceptance); El. FADL, supra note 88.
91. See, e.g., FIQ-H COUNCIL N. AM., http://www.fiqhcouncil.org [http://perma.cc/E8E4-5267];
see also Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origins and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC
L. & CULTURE 27, 54-58 (2002) (presenting five fiqh methods); Ali Al-Timimi, Our
Need for a Fiqh Suitable to Our Time and Place, MISSION ISLAM (1997), http://www.
missionislam.com/knowledge/needforfiqh.htm [http://perma.cc/TGF9-FVA9] (concluding
that "for Muslims to have avenues for arbitration that are recognized by the laws of the
country through which disputes regarding marriage and divorce, [and] financial transac-
tions can be solved is something that is necessary [to] establish Islam in the West"); Sheila
Musaji, Islamic Sharia and Jewish Halakha Arbitration Courts, AM. MUSLIM (May 26,
2o12), http ://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/islamicsharia-andjewish
_halakhaarbitration_courts [http://perma.cc/TR9B-PKRX] ("[I]t would seem that faith
based arbitration is an existing part of our legal system, and that considering sharia as
somehow less acceptable than halakha... has no basis in anything other than prejudice and
stereotyping."); Issa Smith, Native American Courts: Precedent for an Islamic Arbitral System,
AM. MUSLIM (Feb. 15, 2007), http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles
/native-american courtsprecedent for an islamic-arbitral-system/oo13143 [http://perma
.cc/R36V-7YUF ] (urging the Muslim community to create a legal and social network to ad-
dress issues of Muslim family law "imitat[ing] the paradigm of the tribal court system and
its supporting network").
9a. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 14, at 1251 n.93 (providing an example).
93. Muzammil Siddiqi, Taking Disputes to Non-Muslim Courts, ON ISLAM (May 28, 2014),
http ://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/international-relations-and-jihad/private-
international-law/175698-taking-disputes-to-non-muslim-courts.html [http://perma.cc/DB
5V-CJ3A]. In reaching this conclusion, Siddiqi cites the verse in the Qur'an which states, "0
you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those charged with authority from
amongst you. If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messen-
ger, if you do believe in Allah and the Last Day. This is best and most suitable for final de-
termination." Id. (citing THiE QUR'AN 4:59).
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In addition to arbitration before Jewish and Islamic arbitration tribunals,
members of various Christian communities also make use of Christian forms of
alternative dispute resolution. 4 While "Christian forms of dispute resolution
are the least formal, and generally range somewhere between negotiation and
mediation,""5 they also include options for binding arbitration. 6 Indeed,
members of Christian communities interested in Christian dispute resolution
can contact a range of Christian dispute resolution service providers.97 Among
these providers, the most well known is the Institute for Christian Conciliation
(ICC), which not only provides a forum for religious arbitration s but also
trains others to serve as independent arbitrators. 99 The rules for ICC arbitra-
tions are publicly available and include a choice of law provision that requires
arbitrators to "take into consideration any state, federal, or local laws that the
parties bring to their attention," but still emphasizes that "the Holy Scriptures
(the Bible) shall be the supreme authority governing every aspect of the concil-
iation process. '
94. The arbitration agreements for Christian forms of arbitration have frequently found their
way into U.S. courts and have been almost uniformly upheld. See, e.g., Prescott v. Northlake
Christian Sch., 141 Fed. Appx. 263 (5th Cit. 2005); Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87284 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2014); Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schs., Inc.,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76269 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009); Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise
Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 11l (D. Colo. 1999). But see Higher Ground Worship Ctr. v. Arks,
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116138, at *9 (D. Idaho Oct. 6, 2011) (holding that an arbitration
provision, which required the parties to arbitrate before the ICC, was unconscionable be-
cause, among other considerations, it "force[d] the weaker party, i.e., Higher Ground, to
arbitrate all its claims while preserving HG Lease's ability to litigate at least some of its
claims").
9s. R. Seth Shippee, "Blessed Are the Peacemakers": Faith-Based Approaches to Dispute Resolution,
9 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 237, 241 (2002).
96. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 78, at 177-78 (noting the use of arbitration by the Institute for
Christian Conciliation).
97. Shippee, supra note 95, at 242-45 (describing some of the Christian ADR alternatives availa-
ble).
98. Open a Case, INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION (2015), http://peacemaker.net/open-a-case
[http ://perma.cc/2P6K-9FQT].
99. Peacemaker Ministries Certification Program, INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION (2015),
http://www.peacemaker.netjsite/c.aqKFLTOBIpH/b. 1827011/k.D92/PeacemakerMinistrie
sCertificationProgram.htm [http://perma.cc/7CsZ-SCE7].
ioo. Rules of Procedure, INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION (2015), http://peacemaker.net/project
/rules-of-procedure [http://perma.cc/43WB-KLDS]. For a recent discussion of Christian
arbitration in the popular press, see Mark Oppenheimer, An Argument To Turn to Jesus
Before the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2o14/o3/o/us
/before-turning-to-a-judge-an-argument-for-turning-first-to-jesus.html [http://perma.cc
/Y2TY-7UNP]; see also Shippee, supra note 95, at 241 ("Christians draw their traditions of
faith-based dispute resolution from the Bible, particularly the teachings of Jesus Christ.").
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In sum, while Jewish, Islamic, and Christian forms of arbitration vary, all
three seek to establish forms of binding dispute resolution embodying core re-
ligious principles. Efficiency and speed are not the primary goals of the proce-
dural and substantive rules employed in religious arbitration. Instead, both the
rules and the arbitrators selected by the parties promote religious values em-
bedded within the history of each of these respective faith traditions. Parties
look to the Bible or the Qiur'an for rules and procedures -and to religious au-
thorities to apply these rules and procedures -not only to ensure that their se-
lected method of dispute resolution is efficient, but also to ensure that it serves
a religious purpose. Put differently, parties to religious arbitration are not, in
the words of the Supreme Court, simply "trad[ing] the procedures and oppor-
tunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedi-
tion of arbitration";" ' rather, they pursue a wholly different set of objectives by
submitting their disputes to a forum grounded in shared religious worldview.
For this reason, as Daniel Markovits has noted, religious tribunals serve as par-
adigmatic of arbitration tribunals that provide "arbitral solidarity" to the par-
ties, enabling them to "resolve disputes in tribunals that are more sympathetic
to their basic world views than the courts of the dominant culture are prepared
to be."'0
2
To get a sense of religious arbitration's value-oriented focus, consider what
we know about the relative use of pre- and post-dispute arbitration provisions
in both standard and religious arbitration. Although statistical studies on these
questions have some inherent challenges, they provide an important picture
detailing the divergences between the narratives for standard and religious ar-
bitration.
loi. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
loz. See Markovits, supra note i, at 473. Markovits identifies religious arbitration as a form of
"third-party" arbitration possessing "all of the transformative powers associated with the
adjudicatory process," with the substantive rules governing the arbitration arising out of the
inherent authority of the tribunal rather than the autonomous decisions of the parties. Id. at
470. In highlighting religious arbitration, Markovits cites my student work-written with
his guidance and support-that was eventually published under a different title. Id. at 473
n.iii; see Helfand, supra note 14.
While Markovits and I both see religious arbitration as differing from standard forms of
arbitration, we reach opposite conclusions with respect to its relationship to adjudication.
Markovits sees religious arbitration as similar to adjudication, arguing that both aim to
achieve solidarity between the parties. As a result, the structural similarity that Markovits ar-
ticulates does not consider the substantively different objectives of civil adjudication and re-
ligious arbitration. Emphasizing these substantive differences is vital when determining
whether and how to extend legal doctrines governing adjudication to religious arbitration.
Emphasizing the structural similarities between religious arbitration and adjudication might
lead us to embrace these doctrinal extensions; emphasizing the substantive differences in
their objectives would counsel in precisely the opposite direction. See infra Part III.A.
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Among other attempts to consider this question in the context of standard
arbitration,0 3 Lewis Maltby's 2003 study analyzing the relative use of pre- and
post-dispute arbitration clauses is likely the most instructive.0 4 In conducting
his study, Maltby examined two years' worth of filings-from 2001 and 2002-
in employer-employee and business-to-business arbitrations before the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA). According to a computerized analysis con-
ducted by the AAA, the percentage of employment disputes filed pursuant to a
post-dispute arbitration agreement was 6 percent in 2001 and 2.6 percent in
2002.10' A similar computerized analysis of business-to-business disputes de-
termined that the percentage of disputes filed pursuant to a post-dispute arbi-
tration agreement was only 1.8 percent.1, 6 These numbers indicate that parties
to employment arbitrations are very reluctant to arbitrate after a dispute arises.
Once the facts underlying the dispute are known, both parties make strategic
decisions, and it is unlikely that both parties will simultaneously conclude that
arbitration will best serve their interests; 1°7 invariably, arbitration will be seen
as preferable for one party or the other-but not both. 10
lo3. See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" To Arbitrate Through Pre-
dispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55
(2004); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbi-
tration, 79 TENN. L. REv. 289, 346-47 (2012); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study ofArbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008); Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 45; Zachary Gima et al.,
Forced Arbitration: Unfair and Everywhere, PUB. CITIZEN 1 (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www
.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XXB-Q2SK].
104. Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employ-
ment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313 (2003).
1os. Id. at 319. It is worth noting that before the AAA had the capability to collect this data elec-
tronically, Maltby collected data by hand and found that 21% of the filings were made pur-
suant to a post-dispute arbitration agreement. Id. However, that data set included only 312
files, and Maltby was only able to find information regarding the timing of the arbitration
agreement in 73 of those cases. Given these considerations, Maltby concluded that the num-
bers from the automated data collection were likely more accurate. Id. at 319-20.
1o6. Id. at 322. Again Maltby collected data by hand, finding that 9% of disputes in that sample
were filed pursuant to a post-dispute arbitration agreement. Id. However, similar to the
sample described supra note 1O5, the hand-drawn sample size was far smaller, making it
likely that the more accurate percentage is closer to 1.8% than 9%. Id.
107. See Barbara Black, How To Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 59, 105 (2010) ("Once a dispute has
arisen, each side will have a view about whether its claim will fare better in court or in arbi-
tration. As a result, the parties are unlikely to agree, post-dispute, on a choice of forum.");
Rutledge, supra note 44, at 268 ("There simply is no empirical evidence demonstrating the
viability of post-dispute arbitration.").
1o8. A number of scholars have explored this dynamic in the context of employment arbitration.
See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
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By contrast, a survey of the pre- to post-dispute agreement ratio in one
religious arbitration forum suggests results that are precisely the opposite.
Although there are no published studies on the question, according to Beth Din
of America records, 96.8 percent of its arbitration proceedings between January
2008 and August 2014 were conducted pursuant to a post-dispute arbitration
agreement.'0 9 And anecdotal evidence suggests that this is a more general fea-
ture of religious arbitration; some websites for religious arbitration providers
offer boilerplate post-dispute arbitration agreements, but do not include model
pre-dispute arbitration provisions." '
To be sure, these are only indications."' But, at the same time, it does sug-
gest a very different picture of the reasons parties enter religious arbitration.
While parties presumably engage in strategic decision making, the broad use of
post-dispute arbitration agreements indicates that other considerations -not
present in the context of standard arbitration -still drive the parties to mutual-
ly agree on arbitration. The fact that various faiths place a high value on reli-
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559 (2001); Jean R.
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedur-
ally Dfficult Claims, 42 Sw. L. REv. 87 (2012). In his study, Maltby conducted interviews
with management employment attorneys to evaluate the reasons driving the limited use of
post-dispute arbitration, identifying various strategic considerations. Maltby, supra note
104, at 328 ("Some attorneys were simply adverse to arbitration generally. Virtually all man-
agement attorneys we spoke to would not arbitrate where the case could be resolved in court
on pre-trial motions. Others refused to arbitrate if they believed the employee could not af-
ford to pursue litigation. And even when the attorney would choose to arbitrate, the client
often says no. The end result of changing the law so that only post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate are enforceable might well be that most employees with legitimate claims would
receive no justice at all.").
log. E-mail from Shlomo Weissmann, Dir., Beth Din of Am., to author (Dec. 2, 2014, 13:30 PM
EST) (on file with author). The sample from which this percentage was derived includes all
cases for which at least one hearing took place-that is, it does not include cases that were
settled or otherwise disposed of prior to the first hearing. In addition, the sample did not in-
clude cases that purely focused on disputes revolving around execution of the get, the Jewish
divorce document. Id.
11o. See, e.g., Din Torah-Halachic Arbitration, CHI. RABBINICAL COUNCIL (2015), http://www
.crcweb.org/dintorah.php [http://perma.cc/G49M-BFUP] (providing a post-dispute arbi-
tration agreement, but no pre-dispute boilerplate provision); Applications and Forms, RAs-
BINICAL COUNCIL CAL. (2006), http://rccvaad.org/applications-and-forms [http://perma.cc
/5DJ 4 -TG7D] (same).
iii. It is worth noting that there may be variations in this trend. For example, Hobby Lobby, an
arts and crafts chain with over 13,00o employees, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014), incorporates pre-dispute religious arbitration provisions into at
least some of its employment contracts, see, e.g., Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No.
2:13-cv-01619, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140552 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014); Fardig v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., No. SACV 14-561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87284 (C.D. Cal. June 13,
2014).
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gious dispute resolution-precisely because it ensures that religious rules and
principles will govern the arbitration -leads parties to submit disputes to reli-
gious arbitration tribunals even when one of the parties may see some strategic
disadvantages to doing so. Thus, the high rate of post-dispute religious arbi-
tration agreements captures one way in which the unique objectives and aspira-
tions of religious arbitration can drive differences in the practice of arbitration.
Of course, not all forms of arbitration, even those constructed around
shared values, will employ post-dispute arbitration agreements with such high
regularity. For example, labor arbitrations, which, as noted above, can have so-
cial-therapeutic value, are typically conducted pursuant to collective-bargaining
agreements, and thus are negotiated far in advance of a particular labor dis-
pute. As a result, the doctrinal consequences of recognizing these counter-
narrative forms of arbitration will vary by context, requiring the reviewing
court to be sensitive to the particular dynamics within each group or communi-
ty. The fundamental point, however, is that in all cases of counter-narrative ar-
bitration it is essential to integrate the underlying motivations for the decision
to arbitrate into the law's treatment of the proceeding.
Recognizing this counter-narrative is vital if we are to develop a more nu-
anced body of arbitration doctrine. Unfortunately, as described below, im-
portant areas of arbitration doctrine have assumed the standard narrative. Ar-
bitration doctrine has too often equated litigation and arbitration, and has
extended rules to arbitration that, by their terms, cover only judicial proceed-
ings. Building arbitration doctrine around the standard narrative raises serious
legal problems when the arbitration agreements and forums under consi-
deration are designed to achieve a very different set of objectives, and are em-
bedded within a very different social context, from those imagined by the
standard narrative.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF ARBITRATION'S COUNTER-NARRATIVE
Arbitration's counter-narrative requires us to grapple with contexts in
which arbitration aspires to promote first-order values different than those in-
herent to litigation or standard-issue arbitration. Recovering this counter-
narrative suggests that we need a more nuanced arbitration doctrine that ac-
counts for the reasons for parties to select the particular forum. The counter-
narrative exemplified by, but not exclusive to, religious arbitration therefore
requires us to reconsider both how courts define arbitration and how arbitra-
tion agreements are enforced.
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A. Defining Arbitration
It is far from surprising that debate over the degree to which arbitration
can be equated with adjudication continues to animate a wide range of doctri-
nal questions. The FAA fails to provide a definition for arbitration,"' and this
gap has required courts to fashion their own definitions when the issue aris-
es."' When courts have attempted to fill this definitional void, they have at
times reflexively reached back to the standard arbitral narrative, concluding
that arbitration is functionally equivalent to litigation and therefore qualifies as
a "judicial proceeding." And, in the instances where courts have resisted this
functional equation between arbitration and litigation, they have gone to the
opposite extreme, concluding that arbitration should never be equated with lit-
igation. 114
By contrast, emphasizing arbitration's counter-narrative provides reason to
resist these extremes. The fundamental differences motivating parties to enter
different arbitral fora require a more context-sensitive approach to the equation
of arbitration and litigation. Notably, where parties aspire to infuse the arbitral
process with the parties' shared values, applying rules that govern "judicial
proceedings" to arbitration creates problems of fit. To see how, consider the
following recent example.
In Bauer v. Bauer, the Supreme Court of New York evaluated competing
motions to confirm and vacate a religious arbitration award issued by a rabbin-
ical tribunal."' Among the grounds raised to vacate the award was an allegation
that some of the arbitration proceedings were conducted on Sunday." 6 To be
sure, none of the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award included
circumstances where the proceedings took place on Sunday. 117 However, New
York's Judiciary Law provides:
A court shall not be opened, or transact any business on Sunday, nor
shall a court transact any business on a Saturday in any case where such
day is kept as a holy day by any party to the case, except to receive a
verdict or discharge a jury and for the receipt by the criminal court of
112. See 9 U.S.C. § i (2o12) (providing definitions of other terms in the FAA).
113. For a particularly instructive example, see Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57
Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 872-74 (1996).
114. For one example, see infra notes 160-177 and accompanying text.
115. Decisions of Interest: Ruth Bauer, Petitioner v. Irving Bauer, et al., Respondents, N.Y. L.J.,
Jun. 26, 2014, at 36 [hereinafter Bauer v. Bauer] (providing text of the decision).
116. Id.
117. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5 7511 (McKinney 2014) (grounds for vacatur under New York's arbitra-
tion act); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (grounds for vacating an award under the FAA).
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the city of New York or a court of special sessions of a plea of guilty and
the pronouncement of sentence thereon in any case in which such court
has jurisdiction.", 8
While this statute does not reference arbitration, the court advanced the fol-
lowing syllogism. A judicial proceeding cannot take place on Sunday. "Arbitra-
tion is a judicial proceeding and arbitrators perform a judicial function.""1 9
Therefore, "the arbitration proceedings and award herein are void upon the
ground that at least one hearing was held on a Sunday."
20
Some have criticized the logic of Bauer on constitutional grounds. 2' And a
number of other states have reached different conclusions in applying their
own no-Sunday rules-with some holding that arbitration cannot be compared
to adjudication 12 2 and others holding that parties to arbitration can contract
around no-Sunday prohibitions.1 2 3 But Bauer v. Bauer appeared to faithfully
follow nearly 200 years of precedent in New York, which had subsumed arbi-
tration-at least for these purposes-under the rubric of adjudication." In
Brody v. Owens, the New York Appellate Division equated arbitration to adjudi-
cation for the purpose of New York's no-Sunday statute, holding that "[t]he
statute expresses the public policy of the State, and cannot be waived."
s25
Indeed, Bauer is not the only recent decision employing this syllogism. In
Terrace View Estates Homeowners Association v. Bates Drive Condominium III, an-
other New York Supreme Court addressed a case where a rabbinical arbitration
tribunal issued an award after holding arbitration proceedings on Sunday.12 6 In
deciding the case, the court once again embraced a familiar mantra: "Arbitra-
118. N.Y. JUD. L. § 5 (McKinney 2014).
11g. Bauer v. Bauer, supra note 11S.
12o. Id.
121. See Brief for Agudath Israel of Am. as Amicus Curiae, Terrace View Estates Homeowners
Assoc. v. Bates Drive Condo. III, No. 2013-07898 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
122. E.g., Karapschinsky v. Rothbaum, 177 Mo. App. 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914) (declining to apply
Missouri's Sunday laws to an arbitral hearing of unsworn statements of the parties held on
Sunday because it did not constitute a judicial act of the kind prohibited at common law or
statute).
123. E.g., Blood v. Bates, 31 Vt. 147, 150 (1858) ("An award, when made, is more in the nature of a
contract than of a judgment; it is but the consummation of the contract of submission, its
appropriate and legitimate result.").
124. See Story v. Elliot, 8 Cow. 27, 31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (vacating an arbitration award because
it was "made and published on Sunday").
125. Brody v. Owens, 259 A.D. 720, 721 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940).
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tion is a judicial proceeding and arbitrators perform a judicial function and
therefore arbitrations are held to the same rule of law as are Courts."'27 Having
embraced this mantra, the court reached what it deemed to be an inevitable
conclusion-that it "ha[d] no choice but to vacate the Arbitration Award. ,,,8
While both Bauer and Terrace View may have been well grounded in New
York state precedent, it is hard to justify their methodology. Bauer and Terrace
View embrace the standard arbitral narrative that conceives of arbitration as
akin to litigation because both "perform a judicial function."' 9 And because
both arbitration and litigation provide a method for resolving disputes, they
can be equated for the purposes of the no-Sunday rule."'
By contrast, viewing Bauer and Terrace View through the lens of arbitra-
tion's counter-narrative yields a very different analysis. Arbitration's counter-
narrative highlights the way in which not all arbitrations aim to achieve the
same set of purposes. As a result, arbitration and litigation cannot be easily
conflated under the single rubric of "judicial proceedings." Judicial considera-
tion of such cases must therefore begin by evaluating the nature of the parties'
decision to resolve the dispute before a rabbinical court.
For example, in Bauer, the parties to the dispute were all siblings asserting
ownership over various assets.'3 ' The parties signed the agreement post-
dispute, having a full sense of what that agreement entailed. 3 The agreement
required the arbitrators to resolve the dispute in accordance with either Jewish
Law or p'sharah'33-p'sharah serving as a form of compromise that Jewish law
embraces and, according to some, infuses with theological significance. 34 The
parties could have pursued litigation in this matter or chosen another arbitral
forum to resolve the dispute. But instead they chose to submit the dispute to a
rabbinical tribunal and to have that tribunal apply religious rules in resolving
the dispute.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Bauer v. Bauer, supra note 115.
13o. Other New York decisions reaching a similar outcome include Jones v. East Meadow Fire
Dist., 21 A.D.2d 129,131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); and Katz v. Uvegi, 18 Misc. 2d 576, 582 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1959).
131. Bauer v. Bauer, supra note 115.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. CHAIM SAiMAN, HALAKHA: THE RABBINIC IDEA OF LAW, at ch. 7 (forthcoming 2015) (on file
with author); Haim Shapira, The Debate Over Compromise and the Goals of the Judicial Process,
26 DINt ISRAEL 183, 199 (2010).
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In such circumstances, conflating arbitration with adjudication-on the
grounds that both serve judicial functions -is a mistake. The parties in Bauer
chose their selected forum not simply because it would generate a binding
judgment. More important, it was a forum that would resolve their dispute in
accordance with religious rules and values that the parties shared. Thus, the
Bauer parties' chosen process of dispute resolution had what might best be
thought of as a theological or ritualistic component.35 And because the parties
all embraced a shared religious worldview, the selected rabbinical tribunal was
not simply serving a "judicial function"; it was also serving a religious func-
tion, leveraging the shared religious worldview of the parties. 6
In this way, the religious tribunal provided a degree of "arbitral solidarity"
by enabling the parties to "resolve [their] dispute[] in [a] tribunal[] that [was]
more sympathetic to their basic world views than the courts of the dominant
culture [were] prepared to be." '137 This is particularly true given that the no-
Sunday rule at stake has its roots in a Christian tradition that the parties very
well may have viewed as at odds with their own worldview"' Consequently,
conflating arbitration with adjudication in this context directly undermined the
goals both the parties and the forum were trying to achieve. Arbitration, as a
category, is simply too multifaceted for such a reductive classification.
It is worth noting that at least one New York decision appeared to take the
religious function of a rabbinical arbitration tribunal into account when declin-
ing to vacate an award for violating the no-Sunday rule. In Isaacs v. Beth Hame-
dash Society,'39 the court considered a case in which a religious dispute was
submitted to a rabbinical court with the arbitration proceedings taking place on
Sunday. In holding that the Sunday proceedings did not subject the arbitra-
tors' award to vacatur, the court stated the following:
The defendants having consented to settle by arbitration, at the in-
stance of one of their prominent ministers, a controversy growing out
of the wants or requirements of their religious rites, with the special
view of preventing its becoming a matter of public litigation, and the
parties and witnesses having attended voluntarily for that purpose, on a
day evidently the most convenient to them, it would be very much to be
135. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
136. See Helfand, supra note 14, at 1245-51.
137. See Markovits, supra note i, at 473.
138. See Story v. Elliot, 8 Cow. 27, 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (discussing the history of the no-
Sunday rule and noting that "Sunday is stated in all the books, to be dies nonjuridicus; not
made so by the statute; but by a canon of the church, incorporated into the common law").
139. 1 Hilt. 469 (1857).
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regretted if the investigation of the matter on that day should render
the subsequent award of the arbitrators of no avail . .1.o
Here, the religious nature of the arbitration proceedings and the fact that it
conformed to Jewish observances motivated the court to resist vacating the
award. In reaching this conclusion, the court observed: that the parties had
consented to the proceedings; that the proceedings were meant to resolve a
dispute over religious matters; and that the parties wanted to keep their private
religious dispute out of public view. By conceptualizing the case in this way,
the court in Isaacs appeared to recognize that some arbitrations are meant to
achieve other purposes, and that those purposes suggest the inapplicability of
the no-Sunday rule.
But instead of pursuing and developing this line of reasoning, subsequent
New York courts have limited the precedential impact of Isaacs. In Katz v.
Uvegi, the court distinguished Isaacs by noting that "the issues submitted for
arbitration in the case at bar, did not involve any religious dispute, but was
concerned with a dispute over a business transaction."'' Under this logic,
Isaacs would ostensibly apply only where the dispute in question involved
wholly religious matters.
This distinction, however, grossly misunderstands religious arbitration.
Parties select religious arbitration in order to have their disputes governed by
shared religious principles and values. They do so in order not only to have
those values reflected in their chosen method of dispute resolution, but also to
conform their commercial dealings to a shared set of religious values. 142 To
limit the insight of Isaacs to cases where the substance of the dispute is religious
is to miss the transformative aspirations of religious arbitration.
There is, to be sure, a temptation to shrug off these no-Sunday arbitration
cases as so misguided that they provide little in terms of a lesson for other cas-
es, let alone one sufficient to support a counter-narrative. Some of this intui-
tion may stem from general skepticism of the wisdom -if not the constitution-
ality43 - of Sunday-closing laws. As a result, decisions that extend the reach of
such laws may seem so deeply wrongheaded that they are best considered un-
justifiable, though persistent, judicial mistakes. We might therefore be tempted
140. Id. at 473.
141. 18 Misc. 2d 576, 582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
142. For more detail on how certain forms of commerce - "co-religionist commerce" -are geared
simultaneously towards both religious and commercial objectives, see Michael A. Helfand &
Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DuKE L.J. 769 (2015).
143. The Supreme Court has held that Sunday closing laws are constitutional. See Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961).
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to dismiss the arbitration-litigation equation as a peculiar feature of a few out-
dated cases.
Doing so, however, would be a mistake. Indeed, the functional equation
between litigation and arbitration on display in Bauer and Terrace View informs
court decision-making in a wide variety of other contexts. Consider In the Mat-
ter of Ismailoff- a New York Surrogate's Court ruling from 2007. Esther Is-
mailoff had executed an agreement with her four children to create an irrevo-
cable inter vivos trust. 44 The agreement provided that:
In the event that any dispute or question arises with respect to this Dec-
laration of Trust, such dispute or question shall be submitted to arbi-
tration before a panel consisting of three persons of the Orthodox Jew-
ish faith, which will enforce the provisions of this Declaration of Trust
and give any party the rights he is entitled to under New York law. This
Declaration of Trust shall be construed in order to effectuate the intent
of the parties and the parties admit that they have performed all the
necessary requirements for this Declaration to be valid under Jewish
law. The panel will have the authority to file their decision with the
Court under the New York Arbitration Law. The parties have made a
Kinyan Siddur with a garment that may be used for that purpose in or-
der to effectuate this Declaration of Trust. 4
These provisions, requiring that any dispute regarding the agreement be sub-
mitted for arbitration before "three persons of Orthodox Jewish faith"; repre-
senting that the parties "have performed all the necessary requirements for this
Declaration to be valid under Jewish law"; and siating that the parties had ef-
fectuated the transaction via a kinyan siddur- a form of acquisition under Je-
wish law 46 - all indicate that, at the time of execution, compliance with the
process and substance of Jewish law was of central importance to the parties.
The parties subsequently disputed the enforceability of the trust and one of
the parties sought to initiate arbitration proceedings. However, a New York
court concluded that the arbitration provision was unenforceable, holding that
the First Amendment, which prohibits courts "from resolving issues concern-
ing religious doctrine and practice,""rendered the provision requiring the se-
lection of three arbitrators of Orthodox Jewish faith unenforceable. 8 To do
144. In the Matter of Ismailoff, No. 342207, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 1, 2007).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., AARON LEVINE, ECONOMIC MORALITY AND JEWISH LAW 17 (2012) (briefly describing
the "kinyan sudar").
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otherwise, reasoned the court, would have put the court in the constitutionally
untenable position of determining which proposed arbitrators were "Ortho-
dox" and which were not. 49
This holding presented the court with a choice: should the court invalidate
the entirety of the arbitration provision and have the dispute moved to a civil
court, or should it simply sever the "Orthodox Jewish faith" provision and re-
quire the parties to select arbitrators irrespective of their religious affiliation?
Without much reflection, the court chose the latter option. This choice was
somewhat curious given well-settled arbitration doctrine, at least under the
FAA, that instructs courts to invalidate the entirety of the arbitration agree-
ment "where the designation of the arbitrator was 'integral' to the arbitration
provision [and not] merely an ancillary consideration."' s One would have ex-
pected the court in Ismailoff to at least consider the degree to which the arbitra-
tor qualification provision - "three persons of the Orthodox Jewish faith" -was
integral to the agreement. For instance, the court might have asked whether,
bargaining ex ante, the parties would have preferred resolving the dispute be-
fore an arbitration panel without the contractual constraint on the religious af-
filiation of the arbitrators to resolving the dispute before a civil court. The
agreement's repeated focus on conforming its provisions with Jewish law gives
us good reason to believe the contrary.
The court, however, did not give much consideration to this issue, largely
assuming that all arbitrations serve the same ends, and that the provision re-
quiring the panelists all be of the "Orthodox Jewish faith" was not significant
enough to warrant invalidating the entire arbitration clause. This assumption
might make sense in the context of the dominant arbitration narrative, where
arbitration is designed primarily to provide efficient dispute resolution. But it
is precisely this type of assumption that the counter-narrative presented here
aims to correct. Thus, where the agreement indicates that the parties seek to
achieve purposes beyond mere dispute resolution, courts should hesitate before
regarding the choice to arbitrate as a mere form of forum selection. The impli-
149. Id. ("Written submissions of the parties suggest that the criteria applied to determine
whether a proposed arbitrator is 'orthodox' would be in dispute.").
150. See, e.g., Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F. 3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Brown v. ITT Consumer
Fin. Corp., 211 F. 3d 1217, 1222 (1ith Cir. 2000) ("Only if the choice of forum is an integral
part of the agreement to arbitrate, rather than an 'ancillary logistical concern' will the failure
of the chosen forum preclude arbitration."); Gutfreund v. Weiner (In re Salomon Inc.
S'holders' Derivative Litig.), 68 F. 3d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]here 'it is clear that the
failed [forum selection] term is not an ancillary logistical concern but rather is as important
a consideration as the agreement to arbitrate itself, a court will not sever the failed term
from the rest of the agreement and the entire arbitration provision will fail.'" (quoting
Zechmen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill.
1990))).
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cations of this counter-narrative reach a wide range of legal issues - far beyond
no-Sunday and severability rules. Consider the following four examples.
i. Arbitrator Immunity
One recurring doctrinal question is whether arbitrators should receive the
immunity granted to judges. Courts have uniformly answered this question in
the affirmative, analogizing arbitration to adjudication and concluding that
"[b]ased primarily on the 'functional comparability' of the arbitrator's role in a
contractually agreed upon arbitration proceeding to that of his judicial coun-
terpart, [it is appropriate to] immunize[] arbitrators from civil liability for all
acts performed in their arbitral capacity."'' As a result, arbitrators will not be
held liable for a wide range of potentially tortious conduct, including, for ex-
ample, defamatory statements leveled against either of the parties."5 2 Some
scholars have criticized this judicial willingness to grant arbitrators absolute
immunity, arguing that its premise of a functional equivalence between arbitra-
tors and judges is deeply misguided. s3 Arbitrators, these scholars contend, are
not held publicly accountable in the same manner as judges," 4 and, unlike
judges, they choose to serve in an arbitral capacity in exchange for significant
compensation.' ss Effectively, these critics argue, arbitrators are more like pro-
fessional service providers - such as architects and lawyers - than judges.
In counter-narrative cases, however, an entirely different dynamic comes to
the fore. When arbitrators are not simply tasked with providing dispute resolu-
tion services, but also with advancing the shared values of the parties by incor-
porating rules and norms into the arbitration, the analogy between judges and
arbitrators becomes highly fraught. While judges and arbitrators may be
granted immunity so that they can impartially and independently resolve a dis-
151. Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 199o).
1sa. See, e.g., Kabia v. Koch, 713 N.Y.S.2d 250 (N.Y. CiV. Ct. 2000) (arbitrator not liable for call-
ing one of the parties a "kidnapper" during the course of a televised arbitration).
153. See Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV.
151 (2004); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REv. 449 (2004).
154. Weston, supra note 153, at 497-99.
155. See Rutledge, supra note 153, at 168-69 ("[A]rbitrators generally perform their services in
return for a fee paid directly or indirectly by the parties; this fee often is expressly tied to fac-
tors such as the arbitrator's background, the amount in controversy, and the complexity of
the case. By contrast, judges generally do not (and cannot) receive compensation from the
parties for the dispensation of their services." (footnotes omitted)).
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pute, s6 arbitrations that fall within the counter-narrative pursue objectives
outside mere dispute resolution. In the context of religious arbitration, for in-
stance, arbitrators provide the parties with a method of dispute resolution that
delivers religious meaning and implicates the religious standing of the parties
within their given religious community. Failure to submit a dispute to religious
arbitration - or failure to abide by a religious arbitral award - can trigger sig-
nificant social sanctions within the religious community, 5 7 including various
forms of ostracism that can have both interpersonal and financial implica-
tions. , 8 Similarly, the decisions of religious arbitrators, declaring who is in the
right and who is in the wrong, can have significant reputational impact, broad-
ening the potential adverse consequences of the arbitrator's conduct.5 9 In such
circumstances, where arbitral conduct can have an impact well beyond the
simple merits of the dispute, a rule providing blanket arbitral immunity seems
to go too far. It is one thing to protect arbitrators so that they can resolve dis-
putes independently; it is quite another to provide immunity when the conduct
of arbitrators cuts far beyond the immediate context of the dispute itself.
2. Arbitrator Impartiality
Context-sensitive application of doctrine is important as well when it
comes to assessing the impartiality required of the arbitrators. This question
frequently arises when an arbitrator fails to disclose a relationship with one of
the parties: when is such a failure sufficient to trigger a presumption of "evi-
dent partiality" such that the award is subject to vacatur?16° In addressing this
156. See, e.g., Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th Cit. 1982) ("The rationale be-
hind the Supreme Court decisions is that the independence necessary for principled and
fearless decision-making can best be preserved by protecting these persons from bias or in-
timidation caused by the fear of a lawsuit arising out of the exercise of official functions
within their jurisdiction."); Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204, 217 (Cal. 1994) ("'Arbitral im-
munity, like judicial immunity, promotes fearless and independent decisionmaking."'
(quoting Baar v. Tigerman, 211 Cal. Rptr. 426,428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983))).
157. See infra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
i59. See, e.g., Raquel J. Greenberg, Note, Tzedek Tzedek Tirdof. How Female Religious Court Advo-
cates Can Mitigate the Lack ofludicial Review of the American Beth Din System, 19 CARDOzO J.L.
& GENDER 635, 644 (2013) (describing worries about the American Beth Din system, where
religious arbitrators "misemploy their authority by instituting orders of contempt to those
who do not deserve to receive such a debilitating decree, thereby defaming the innocent
reputations of litigants").
16o. See 9 U.S.C. § 1o(a)(2) (2012) ("In any of the following cases the United States court in and
for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon
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question, the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. highlighted the standards of impartiality de-
manded of judges. The majority emphasized that "a decision should be set
aside where there is 'the slightest pecuniary interest' on the part of the judge"161
and concluded that "we can see no basis for refusing to find the same concept
in the broad statutory language that governs arbitration proceedings. '' ,62 Ac-
cordingly, where arbitrators failed to disclose such relationships, the subse-
quent award would be subject to vacatur for "evident partiality" because failure
to disclose such dealings "might create an impression of possible bias."
61
However, Justice White took issue with this equation, arguing in a concur-
ring opinion joined by Justice Marshall that the holding in the majority opin-
ion should be construed more narrowly: "The Court does not decide today that
arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial decorum of Article III
judges, or indeed of any judges."' 6, In fact, Justice White's opinion expressed
an inherent skepticism of the equation between judges and arbitrators: "It is
often because [arbitrators] are men of affairs, not apart from but of the mar-
ketplace, that they are effective in their adjudicatory function.", 6,
Because Justices White and Marshall's votes constituted the fifth and sixth
votes in Commonwealth Coatings, federal courts of appeals have questioned how
broadly to read the Court's holding and the extent to which Justice White's po-
sition should be taken to weaken the disclosure standard for relationships be-
166tween an arbitrator and one of the parties. Most courts have followed Justice
White's concurrence.167 These courts have required arbitrators to disclose rela-
the application of any party to the arbitration... where there was evident partiality or cor-
ruption in the arbitrators, or either of them .... ").
161. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (quoting Tu-
mey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 149.
164. Id. at 15o (White, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Compare Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F. 3d 278, 283
(5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (following Justice White's concurrence in Commonwealth Coat-
ings), with Schmitz v. Zilveti, 2o F. 3d 1043, 1045 (9 th Cir. 1994) (interpreting Justice White's
concurrence so that it does not conflict with the majority opinion). See also Merit Ins. Co. v.
Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The ethical obligations of arbitrators
can be understood only by reference to the fundamental differences between adjudication by
arbitrators and adjudication by judges and jurors.").
167. See Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 283 ("Only the Ninth Circuit has interpreted
Commonwealth Coatings... to de-emphasize Justice White's narrowing language.").
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tionships that are "significant " 68 as opposed to "attenuated" or "nonsubstan-
tial," 6, standards of impartiality far less stringent than those placed on judges.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has embraced an "appearance of bias" standard
for arbitrators, a standard familiar from the judicial context17° that requires ar-
bitrators to disclose relationships establishing a "reasonable impression of im-
partiality.""z'
But the core intuition captured in the arbitral counter-narrative counters
both of these approaches. It suggests that courts must take note of the particu-
lars of the specific arbitration, rather than incorporating a single standard gov-
erning all arbitrations. To see why, consider again the paradigmatic example of
the arbitral counter-narrative, religious arbitration. In the context of religious
arbitration, arbitrators are often drawn from the ranks of religious community
leaders who are selected by the parties precisely because of their intimate
knowledge of religious principles and values shared by the parties.172 As a re-
sult, parties will select particular arbitrators precisely because there is a pre-
existing relationship based upon the joint participation in a given religious
community.
And what is true for religious arbitration is true more generally for the var-
ious forms of arbitration that aim to advance the set of communal values
shared by the parties. 73 As Nancy Welsh has noted, parties in this sort of arbi-
168. See, e.g., Ameser v. Nordstrom, Inc., 442 F. App'x 967, 970 (5th Cir. 2011); Uhl v. Komatsu
Forklift Co., 512 F. 3 d 294, 307 (6th Cir. 2008).
169. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F. 3d 4 93, 4 99 (4th Cir. 1999).
17o. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized that implementing an "appearance of bias"
standard yields different results for arbitrators than for judges. See Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1046-
47 ("Expert arbitrators will nearly always, of necessity, have numerous contacts within their
field of expertise. Thus, arbitrators have many more potential conflicts of interest than judg-
es. In arbitration, moreover, only disclosure and not recusal is required. Given these differ-
ences, it is clear that the actual standard for arbitrators does differ from that for judges, even
though language used to describe both standards may be similar." (citing Commonwealth
Coatings, 393 U.S. at 15o)).
171. Id.
172. Having religious communal authorities resolve the dispute is one of the primary motivations
behind religious arbitration. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
173. For examples of articles considering the dynamics and consequences of cultural or commu-
nal relationships between parties and arbitrators, see Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra
note 8, at 312 ("That the testator shared a common minority culture with the arbitrator,
however, should not alone disqualify the arbitrator from adjudicating the will contest. Alt-
hough such a shared culture can be expected to give rise to greater understanding between
the arbitrator and the testator, the arbitrator's interest in the dispute might remain quite at-
tenuated."); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is "(Im)Partial Enough" in a World of Embedded Neu-
trals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REv. 395, 397-98 (2010) (describing the phenomenon of "embedded neu-
trals ... whose involvement [in resolving the dispute] is the result of their association with
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tration seek out "embedded neutrals" - that is, arbitrators who are often "wise,
respected elder[s] within the community or identity group to which both par-
ties belong."' 4 Doing so enables parties to ensure that the arbitrators "share[]
the norms that animate both of the disputing parties and can help to resolve
their dispute in a manner that both parties are likely to view as principled." 75
In such cases, courts should be far more reluctant to infer "evident partiali-
ty" from the failure of arbitrators to disclose these relationships. Under prevail-
ing doctrine, it is the expectations of the parties that justify inferring partiality
from the failure to disclose; where a party would typically expect an arbitrator
to disclose a relationship, the failure to do so gives us good reason to believe
that the arbitrator's impartiality might be compromised. 76 But when it comes
to cases within the arbitral counter-narrative, some such relationships are ex-
pected by the parties themselves. Far more than mere non-disclosure should
therefore generally be required to trigger vacatur of an award.
To be sure, narrowing the scope of disclosure that would trigger vacatur in
counter-narrative cases raises some important concerns. In smaller and more
insular communities, the potential for relationships between parties and arbi-
trators to cloud decision-making looms large. Indeed, as discussed below, that
is precisely why courts must remain particularly vigilant when policing the
forms of social pressure and communal duress that drive parties to submit dis-
putes for binding arbitration."
That being said, to raise the bar for non-disclosure does not open the door
for arbitrators to conduct proceedings with evident partiality. Importantly,
conduct that is partial would still trigger vacatur. The only proposal suggested
here is to modify the degree of non-disclosure that would constitute apresump-
tion of evident partiality-a presumption that is justified by the degree of dis-
closure expected ex ante by the parties. And where arbitrators and parties all
inhabit the same communal space, it seems reasonable to presume that the par-
one or more of the parties involved in the dispute" and noting that "[n]eutrals of this type
have long existed to resolve disputes within workplaces, faith communities, or between so-
phisticated parties who are members of the same trade or profession and have voluntarily
chosen to be bound by an arbitrator's decision").
174. Welsh, supra note 173, at 398.
175. Id.
176. Compare Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (de-
scribing the majority's approach to the disclosure requirement) with id. at i5o (White, J.,
concurring) (describing Justice White's competing standard). For a related discussion, see
Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 485, 492 (1997) ("Where an
arbitrator has failed at the outset to disclose a relationship with one of the parties, his failure
may well be treated by a court as 'rais[ing] more suspicion' with respect to his impartiality
than if the relationship had 'been dealt with openly.'").
177. See infra Part III.B.
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ties are already fully aware or at least on notice of relationships within their
shared community.
Moreover, to the extent a party sought to invoke the parties' shared com-
munity in order to shield an award from vacatur, the party would still have to
present sufficient evidentiary grounds to justify enforcing the award notwith-
standing the arbitrators' failure to disclose a relationship; thus, a party arguing
against vacatur would bear the burden of proving that the parties shared the
same community, thereby justifying the presumption that the complaining
party fully expected some degree of relationship between the arbitrators and
the parties. As a result, there may still very well be counter-narrative cases
where an undisclosed relationship between an arbitrator and a party will be
sufficient to justify vacatur on the grounds of evident partiality-cases where
the extent of the relationship went beyond what would be expected or typical
within a given community. But those cases would likely be less typical than
they are within the context of the standard arbitration narrative. Indeed, when
it comes to counter-narrative arbitrations, courts should recognize that parties
are typically looking for arbitrators from within their community -arbitrators
that understand the full nature of the dispute because of their relationships with
the parties -who can best leverage the shared communal bonds to provide a
resolution not only ending the dispute itself, but doing so in accordance with
the parties' shared values and principles.
3. State Action
Similar definitional issues arise in debates over whether arbitrator miscon-
duct can constitute state action. Continued concerns about the lack of proce-
dural protections granted to parties in arbitration have lead critics to propose
looking to the Constitution's Due Process protections to modulate the range of
acceptable procedures in arbitration. 17' At first glance, importing constitutional
requirements into the context of arbitration seems peculiar. Arbitration is a
creature of private contract; triggering the constitutional requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires state action. 179
178. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 43; Reuben, supra note 41; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of
Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1997).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action."); Nat'l Collegiate Ath. Ass'n v. Tar-
kanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) ("Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment's
Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield,
no matter how unfair that conduct may be."); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)
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In response to the perceived disconnect between private arbitration and
public constitutional rights, some scholars have highlighted ways in which cur-
rent state-action doctrine might still be interpreted to include conduct by pri-
vate arbitrators during private arbitration proceedings. The fact that the doc-
trine remains a fertile ground for interpretation and creativity is far from
surprising; scholars continue to echo Charles Black's characterization of the
state-action doctrine as "a conceptual disaster area. ,,8 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has noted that it has "articulated a number of different factors or tests in
different contexts" when trying to ascertain the presence of state action. 8,
Choosing from among these various tests and factors, some scholars have ar-
gued that the conduct of arbitrators ought to constitute state action under the
("This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of it. It does
not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of
State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State action, of
the kind referred to.").
18o. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protec-
tion, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); see also Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 504 n.4 (1985) (discussing Judge Friend-
ly's invocation of Black); Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra -Fourteen Years
Later, 130 U. PA. L. Rv. 1289, 1290 (1982) (commenting that Black's statement that the
"state action cases were a 'conceptual disaster area' . . . would appear even more apt to-
day."); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitu-
tional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302, 303 (1995) ("The
state action doctrine, with its intricate mantras and talismanic phrases, has been and re-
mains a dark thicket of constitutional law."); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a
New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEo. L.J. 779, 817 (2004) ("Black was right to call for the abolition
of the state action doctrine in equal protection because its application immunized the exer-
cise of racial power from constitutional review."). For a recent proposal arguing for rethink-
ing state action doctrine as it has grown up around the seminal case of Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), see Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time
for Keeping; a Time for Throwing Away"?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61 (1998).
181. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) ("Whether these different tests are
actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-
bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be resolved here."). The
Court in Lugar proposed a further framework for evaluating the existence of state action, see
id. at 937 ("First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom
the State is responsible.... Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor."); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991) ("Our precedents establish that, in determining whether a par-
ticular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the
following: the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits ...
whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function... and whether the in-
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"public function" framework.1"2 Under this test, "when private individuals or
groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in na-
ture, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its
constitutional limitations.', '5  Accordingly, arbitration, as one scholar has ar-
gued, ought to be considered state action because "[t]he binding resolution of
disputes is, of course, a traditionally exclusive public function. Indeed, it is dif-
ficult to contemplate a function traditionally more exclusive than . . . 'the





There are, of course, a wide range of doctrinal rejoinders to this argu-
ment. a8 5 And courts have not been hospitable to claims predicated on finding
the conduct of arbitrators to constitute state action; in fact, they have uniform-
182. See Reuben, supra note 41, at 997-98 (2000). For an alternative view, see Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (discussing the public func-
tion test as applied to commercial arbitration).
183. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(discussing how a private organization took on a public function in the electoral context);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) ("In our view the circumstance that the proper-
ty rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were
held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation
to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the en-
forcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute.").
184. Reuben, supra note 41, at 997-98. Scholars have also contended that arbitration ought to be
considered state action because of the degree of the government's support of and entangle-
ment with commercial arbitration. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 43, at 1O9 ("The FAA makes
arbitration clauses efficacious by making valid arbitration clauses enforceable in federal
court .... The legislation empowers federal courts to force or compel arbitration and to stay
pending litigation until arbitration is concluded. It also provides that a court can enforce an
award by 'confirming' it .... Under the FAA, courts facilitate arbitration by forcing parties
to honor arbitration clauses and by making awards equivalent to court judgments."); Reu-
ben, supra note 41, at 1OO6 (" [T]he statutory schemes that establish an intimate involvement
between arbitrators and the public courts toward the single end of state-enforced dispute
resolution may be seen as establishing an inseverable and indispensable nexus between
seemingly private actors and their governmental partners .... As such, it would seem that
the "private use of [arbitration] with the help of state officials constitutes state action.");
Sternlight, supra note 178, at 42 ("[T]he FAA and equivalent state statutes allow parties to
use court processes to compel arbitration, to confirm the private award as a judgment, and
then to appeal the arbitrators' findings. Where parties so use the courts to enforce their pri-
vate agreement it would seem that state action exists.").
18s. For example, the Court subsequently has significantly narrowed the public function test.
See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159-6o (19 7 8) (requiring that the func-
tion in question be exclusively a public function); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974); see also Cole, supra note 182, at 21 (noting that "[t]he Court's use of 'exclusivity' as a
means for determining whether a particular private action is a public function resulted in a
test that is very difficult to satisfy").
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ly rejected such claims. 86 But it is worth noting that the public function argu-
ment simply assumes that arbitration serves a function identical to judicial res-
olution of disputes. This premise constitutes a wholehearted embrace of the
standard narrative by conceptualizing the functions of arbitration and litigation
as the same.
The core lesson of the arbitral counter-narrative is that we should push
back against this claim. As courts and scholars continue to address arguments
contending that arbitrators serve a public function-and therefore can be
deemed state actors-the arbitral counter-narrative reminds us that various
forms of arbitration are organized to pursue aims and objectives beyond mere
dispute resolution. In those circumstances, it is far more difficult to claim that
these arbitrations play a role equivalent to that of their litigation counterparts.
The fact that some arbitrations aim both to resolve disputes and to promote
shared values undermines the claims of direct equivalency of function that are
predicates for the public function argument and suggests its almost certain in-
applicability in counter-narrative cases.
4. Public Access to Arbitration
While the counter-narrative discussed here highlights how parties use arbi-
tration to pursue various first-order values beyond dispute resolution, such
values can be introduced into particular arbitration settings in other ways as
well. To take a recent and high profile example, consider the Third Circuit's
decision addressing the constitutionality of Delaware's attempt to empower the
Chancery Court to arbitrate business disputes.187
To "preserve Delaware's pre-eminence in offering cost-effective options for
resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and
technology matters, " , 8 the legislature authorized the Chancery Court, pursu-
ant to an agreement between parties to a potential suit, to arbitrate disputes,
with the parties paying $12,000 to file, plus $6,000 in costs per day after the
first day of the of the proceedings. 8 9 Access to this arbitration option was lim-
186. DRAHOzAL, supra note 19, at 18 (noting that "[a]ll federal courts that have addressed the is-
sue have held that commercial arbitration is not 'state action' to which constitutional protec-
tions apply").
187. See lo DEL. CODE ANN. tit. io, § 349 (2009); Del. Ch. R. 96-98. For more on the relation-
ship between this litigation and general trends, see Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Pro-
cess: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793,
1820-22 (2014); Thomas J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, or Closed Door Lit-
igation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP &L. 349 (2013).
i88. H.B. 49, 4 5 th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009).
189. Del. Coal. for Open Gov't, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 2013).
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ited: at least one of the parties needed to be a Delaware corporation, organized
under Delaware law; neither party could be a consumer; and the amount in
controversy needed to be at least $i,ooo,ooo.9° The dispute would be arbitrat-
ed by a Chancery Court judge and would take place in a Delaware courthouse
during normal business hours."9' Notably, this legislatively created arbitration
system provided that the "[a]rbitration proceedings shall be considered confi-
dential and not of public record until such time, if any, as the proceedings are
the subject of an appeal."1 92
A coalition formed to challenge this new system, arguing that the system,
for all intents and purposes, transformed judicial proceedings into secret arbi-
trations shielded from public scrutiny 93 and therefore violated the public's
First Amendment right of access to trials. 94 In evaluating this claim, the Third
Circuit invoked the "experience and logic" test, which determines whether "[a]
proceeding qualifies for the First Amendment right of public access" by evalu-
ating "when 'there has been a tradition of accessibility' to that kind of proceed-
ing, and when 'access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question. ' ' "
The court, however, faced some significant challenges in applying the test.
As the court itself noted, it was far from clear which proceedings the court
should examine to determine whether there was a "tradition of accessibility."
96
Not surprisingly, the defendants argued that the proper point of comparison
was arbitration; the proceedings were, after all, characterized as arbitrations. 197
By contrast, the plaintiffs argued that the proceedings were best compared to
civil trials -and that therefore the court should determine whether there was a
tradition of public accessibility to civil trials. 98 As the court well understood,
the fundamental problem was in determining the baseline: should the court
classify Delaware's new dispute resolution system as providing for arbitration,
and therefore engage in the First Amendment "tradition of accessibility" in-
quiry by examining the extent of public access to other forms of arbitration; or
19o. Id. at 524.
191. Id. at 512-13.
192. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 10, § 349(b) (2009).
193. Brief for Appellee at 19-30, Strine, 733 F. 3d 51o (No. 12-3859).
194. Id. at 12-19.
195. Strine, 733 F.3d at 514 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, lo (1986)).
196. Id. at 515.
197. Id. ("The litigants in this case disagree over which history is relevant to Delaware's proceed-
ings. The Appellants suggest that we only examine the history of arbitrations, whereas the
Coalition suggests we only examine the history of civil trials.").
198. Id.
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should the court classify Delaware's new dispute resolution system as effecting
a system equivalent to the civil trial, and therefore engage in the First Amend-
ment "tradition of accessibility" inquiry by examining the scope of public ac-
cess to civil trials? In other words, to answer the First Amendment question,
the court had to consider the question: to what extent was Delaware's pro-
posed system of arbitration simply a form of civil litigation? 99
Instead of choosing one option or the other, the court embraced a "broad
historical approach" that considered the history of both civil trials and arbitra-
tion.200 Central to the analysis was an emphasis on how arbitration has
changed over time: arbitration, the court noted, has not always been shielded
from public view.20' The court therefore concluded that "[t]he history of arbi-
tration thus reveals a mixed record of openness." °" Describing this "mixed
record," 3 the court explained that the public has generally not had access to
private arbitrations -that is, arbitration proceedings organized under the aus-
pices of modern arbitration service providers.20 4 By contrast, some earlier
forms of arbitration are reported to have actually taken place in public with
judges sometimes presiding in an unofficial capacity. °0 Given this historical
record, the court characterized the history of public access as follows:
Proceedings in front of judges in courthouses have been presumptively
open to the public for centuries. History teaches us not that all arbitra-
tions must be closed, but that arbitrations with non-state action in pri-
vate venues tend to be closed to the public. Although Delaware's gov-
ernment-sponsored arbitrations share characteristics such as
informality, flexibility, and limited review with private arbitrations,
they differ fundamentally from other arbitrations because they are con-
ducted before active judges in a courthouse, because they result in a
199. Id. ("If we were to only analyze the history of arbitrations as the Appellants suggest, we
would be accepting the state's designation of its proceedings as arbitrations at face value.
Uncritical acceptance of state definitions of proceedings would allow governments to pre-
vent the public from accessing a proceeding simply by renaming it .... The Coalition's sug-
gestion - that we rely solely on the history of civil trials - is also flawed. Defining Delaware's
proceeding as a civil trial at the outset would beg the question at issue here, and elide the
differences between Delaware's arbitration proceeding and other civil proceedings.").
zoo. Id. at 516.
2ol. Id. at 517-19.
2o2. Id. at 518.
203. Id. at 517-18 (citing, among other sources, Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation:
The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively Ameri-
can Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, lo THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423, 445-46 (2009)).
204. Id. at 518.
205. Id. at 516-17.
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binding order of the Chancery Court, and because they allow only a
limited right of appeal." 6
The court's analysis is striking because it does not simply classify the new
arbitration system as a system of civil trials masquerading as arbitration. Such
an approach, to be sure, would have yielded a similar result -that is, that Del-
aware's proposed arbitration system violated the First Amendment by failing to
afford the public access to the proceedings. Instead, the court highlighted the
ways in which the institutional setting of a particular arbitration impacts the
character of the first-order values the forum is meant to promote. Thus, the
court identified a variety of context-sensitive considerations leading to the con-
clusion that First Amendment values required providing public access to the
arbitration; the fact that the arbitration was to be held in a public courthouse
and presided over by a state-court judge meant that the proceedings were suffi-
ciently within the public interest to require public access. In this way, the set-
ting of the arbitration and the identity of the arbitrators transformed the law's
conceptualization of the values at stake in the proceedings and led the court to
conclude that First Amendment concerns were triggered.
The structural and institutional dimensions of the Delaware arbitrations
led the Third Circuit to recognize that the distinct features of the Delaware ar-
bitrations implicated the machinery of government and were, to use the court's
language, "government-sponsored" because they were held in courthouses and
employed public judges. In this way, rather than conflating different forms of
arbitration and then confusing those with adjudication, the court distinguished
between forms of arbitration based upon their particular institutional fea-
tures.2"7 While religious arbitration is paradigmatic of cases in which the par-
ties infuse the arbitration with shared values, Strine highlights the way in
which the institutional dimensions of arbitration can implicate values and in-
terests beyond dispute resolution. Thus, in Strine, the setting of the arbitration
(the courthouse) and the identity of the arbitrators (judges) required the court
to protect other first-order values, specifically the public's First Amendment
right to access. In this way, Strine further highlights how a wide range of con-
siderations- from the objectives of the parties to the location of the arbitra-
206. Id. at 518.
207. Had Strine implicated a counter-narrative form of arbitration-as opposed to "government
sponsored" arbitration -it might have raised tensions between the public values that Fiss
and Resnik have identified in adjudication and the transformative values at stake in counter-
narrative forms of arbitration. Identifying a counter-narrative does not, by itself, provide a
blueprint for resolving conflicts between these potentially competing first-order values. Re-
solving such conflicts requires an independent moral or political theory that addresses how
and when public values should accommodate the values of particular citizens.
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tion-can implicate various values in a particular arbitral forum. And this dy-
namic once again underscores the fundamental insight of the arbitral counter-
narrative, which embraces the multifarious nature of arbitration and resists re-
ductive reasoning that either conflates litigation and arbitration or sees all
forms of arbitration as fundamentally identical.
B. Agreeing to Arbitration
The lofty aspirations of religious arbitration can at times also emerge as the
forum's Achilles heel. Religious arbitration tribunals provide parties with the
option to resolve disputes in accordance with shared religious rules and values.
But sometimes parties agree to submit disputes to religious arbitration tribu-
nals not because they personally desire to have their dispute resolved in accord-
ance with a particular brand of religious law, but because they find themselves
enmeshed in a religious community that expects them to do so. In this way, the
fact that religious tribunals serve as extensions of religious communal values is
both a strength -it enables parties to incorporate shared religious values into
the process of dispute resolution -as well as a weakness: the expectations of
religious communities can put pressure on reluctant members to forego access
to judicial resolution of disputes in favor of the community's preferred reli-
gious tribunal.
Because of religious norms favoring religious dispute resolution within
particular ommunes, a party's refusal to arbitrate before a religious arbi-
tration tribunal can entail social consequences.20 9 For example, under Jewish
law, an individual who refuses to submit a dispute for arbitration before a rab-
binical arbitration tribunal will receive a seruv (similar to a contempt order),
which conveys strong communal disapproval"' and can carry significant social
sanctions." Therefore, the signing of a religious arbitration agreement could
208. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
2o9. See Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor's Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Con-
duct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 157, 169-70 (2011) (discussing social sanctions imposed by reli-
gious communities for failure to appear before a religious tribunal).
210. See Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REv. 449, 470-72 (2009) (discuss-
ing sanctions used by religious groups to influence and respond to the choices made by in-
dividual group members); Fried, supra note 82, at 635-41 (discussing religious judicial ac-
tion and its consequences on an individual's status in the community); Wolfe, supra note 78,
at 442 (noting that by seeking religious arbitration members of a religious community are
considered to be maintaining togetherness and unity); see also Grossman, supra note 78, at
197-98 (explaining the direct social consequences of religious arbitration judgments).
211. See, e.g., In re Herman Pachman, No. 09-37475, 2010 W.L 1489914 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
2OO) (alleging that a seruv, issued by a rabbinical court, led other members of the religious
community to avoid doing business with the petitioner and to refuse marrying their chil-
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be seen, in some circumstances, as far from consensual. This has led some to
worry about whether religious arbitration tribunals, to the extent the parties
submit their disputes because of these communal pressures, can truly claim to
operate with the consent of the parties. 2 However, in the few cases where par-
ties have petitioned a court to invalidate a religious arbitration agreement on
the grounds of duress, courts have uniformly rejected those claims, instead en-
forcing the agreements and compelling arbitration. 3
Of course, duress is only one of many defenses that a party might marshal
against a religious arbitration agreement. Unconscionability, for example, is an
attractive alternative given its success in the arbitration context. 4 Moreover,
unconscionability takes various forms of unfairness into account, focusing both
on defects in the process of forming an agreement as well as defects in the sub-
stantive impact of the agreement. 15 To raise an unconscionability claim, parties
typically must demonstrate the existence of both "procedural" unconscionabil-
dren to petitioner's children); Abdelhak v. Jewish Press Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 211 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2oo9) (alleging that plaintiff lost the patronage of his Orthodox Jewish clien-
tele as a result of a seruv).
212. Ayelet Shachar, the preeminent scholar engaging with these questions, has argued that this
dynamic can thrust parties before religious tribunals on the horns of a your-culture-or-your-
rights dilemma. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFfER-
ENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 117-45 (2001); Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Caution-
ary Tale from Religious Arbitration Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIESL. 573 (2oo8).
213. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Greenberg, 238 A.D.2d 420,421 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1997) ("The
'threat' of a siruv, which entails a type of ostracism from the religious community, and
which is prescribed as an enforcement mechanism by the religious law to which the peti-
tioner freely adheres, cannot be deemed duress." (citing Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566
N.Y.S.2d 490,494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991))); Mikel v. Scharf, 432 N.Y.S.2d 6o2, 6o6 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 198o) ("Undoubtedly, pressure was brought to bear to have them participate in the
Din Torah, but pressure is not duress. Their decision to acquiesce to the rabbinical court's
urgings was made without the coercion that would be necessary for the agreement to be
void.").
214. For articles discussing the success of unconscionability in the arbitration context, see Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420 (2008); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility
to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements To Arbitrate,
2006 J. DIsp. RESOL. 469; Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements lo Years After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 249 (20o6); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 18S (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight
to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757 (2004).
215. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 4-7, at 168 (5th
ed. 2000) ("Most courts take a 'balancing approach' to the unconscionability question, and
... seem to require a certain quantum of procedural, plus a certain quantum of substantive,
unconscionability.").
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ity-what Arthur Leff famously referred to as "bargaining naughtiness',,6 -
and "substantive" unconscionability, which includes "contractual terms that
are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored
party does not assent." 217
In principle, the dual focus of unconscionability would seem to provide a
doctrinal antidote to concerns over the volitional nature of religious arbitra-
tion."8 A court could consider communal pressure exercised by a religious
community as constituting procedural unconscionability "preclud[ing] the
weaker party from enjoying a meaningful opportunity to negotiate and choose
the terms of the contract." 9 And where such pressures were exerted in a con-
text in which the religious arbitration tribunal served as a forum fundamentally
skewed in favor of one party over the other- a recurring concern of feminist
critics worrying that religious tribunals systematically favor men over wom-
en' o -then unconscionability could enable a party to void the agreement."
216. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 487 (1967).
217. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). For court discussions of the
requirement that both procedural and substantive unconscionability be present before a
court will refuse to enforce the contract, see Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) ("'The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive
unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to re-
fuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.'" (quoting Stir-
len v. Supercuts, Inc., et al., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997))); and State v.
Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 406 N.E.2d 1075, 1078 (N.Y. 198o) ("As a general proposition, uncon-
scionability ... requires some showing of 'an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the oth-
er party."' (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965))).
218. I have elsewhere more fully explored the applicability of the unconscionability doctrine to
religious arbitration agreements. See Helfand, supra note 14, at 1294-1303.
219. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F. 3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003).
220. In this context one prominent concern is the classical rules in both Jewish and Islamic Law
that either prohibit or limit the evidentiary value of female testimony. See generally
Shimshon Ettinger, Testimonial Competence of Women in Civil Matters Under Jewish Law, 20-
21 DINt ISRAEL 241 (2OO1); Mohammad Fadel, Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power,
and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal Thought, 29 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 185, 18S (1997)
(noting how Muslim feminists have argued that a male-dominated interpretation of Islam
has prevailed for centuries). However, it is worth noting that the exclusionary approach to
female testimony is not always implemented in actual contemporary practice. See Ruth
Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR-
EIGN AFF. 339, 356 (2000) (noting that, while as a formal matter women cannot serve as wit-
nesses under Jewish law, "rabbinical courts routinely accept women's testimony and practi-
cally accord it the same evidentiary weight that is accorded to men's testimony"). The
broader issue of asymmetries between the treatment between men and women in the con-
text of religious tribunals has been thoroughly and insightfully explored by Ayelet Shachar.
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Thus, for example, if a party executed a religious arbitration agreement under
significant pressure from her religious community and then learned in the
course of the arbitration proceedings that her star witness would not be al-
lowed to testify because she is female," 2 the party could potentially raise a
claim of unconscionability: the communal pressure could constitute procedural
unconscionability because it undermined the capacity for meaningful choice,
and the religious rule against a female witness might be deemed sufficiently
unfair and one-sided to render the arbitration agreement substantively uncon-
scionable. Together, the existence of procedural and substantive unconsciona-
bility could serve to void the religious arbitration agreement. 3
But the promise of unconscionability is severely undermined by the doc-
trine of waiver, which is a direct consequence of the doctrinal obsession with
arbitration's dominant narrative. A party is considered to have waived objec-
tions to an arbitration agreement once it participates in arbitration proceed-
ings. The reasoning here is straightforward:
To the extent that a party is entitled to challenge the validity of an
agreement to arbitrate, the time to raise that issue is before the matter
goes to arbitration, not after. Otherwise a party could hold back, await
the outcome of the arbitration, and then blithely render it null simply
by challenging the validity of the proceedings. Failure to challenge arbi-
trability in timely fashion and participating in the arbitration proceed-
ings, in other words, will result in waiver of the right to object.2
See, e.g., SHAcHAR, supra note 212, at 45-62; Shachar, supra note M12; Ayelet Shachar, Reli-
gion, State and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Soci-
eties, 5o McGILL L.J. 49 (2005). For examples of other recent discussions, see Marie Ashe &
Anissa Helie, Realities of Religio-Legalism: Religious Courts and Women's Rights in Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, 20 U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 139 (2014); Gila
Stopler, The Challenge of Strong Religion in the Liberal State, 32 B.U. INT'L L.J. 411 (2014);
Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 501, 539-42 (2012) (discussing the question in the context of the debate in Ontario over
religious arbitration of family law matters).
2zi. For examples of substantively unconscionable terms, see Bruhl, supra note 214, at 1437-39;
and Stempel, supra note 214, at 803-07.
222. See supra note 220.
223. For my take on the use of unconscionability in the religious arbitration context, see Helfand,
supra note 14, at 1294-1303. For more on why failure to admit female testimony would likely
not subject the subsequent arbitration award to vacatur on account of the arbitrator "refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy," 9 U.S.C. 5 lo(a)(3), see Mi-
chael A. Helfand, Between Law and Religion: Procedural Challenges to Religious Arbitration
Awards, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141 (2015).
224. Owen-Williams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D.
Md. 1995).
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This mantra that parties waive challenges to an arbitration agreement by par-
ticipating in arbitration proceedings has been repeatedly recited by courts."
And the logic behind waiver always remains the same; the time to challenge an
arbitration agreement is before the proceedings begin, not after. 6
To be sure, courts have tried to calibrate the waiver inquiry, examining a
range of considerations before concluding that a party has waived its right to
challenge the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Thus some courts
have concluded that participation in various preliminary matters - such as
scheduling conferences, arbitrator selection, submission of papers contesting
various factual allegations - is insufficient to trigger waiver of the right to chal-
lenge the underlying arbitration agreement.17
But while courts have embraced a variety of factors as bearing on the waiv-
er inquiry, they remain wedded to the standard picture of arbitration in evalu-
ating waiver claims - a model in which, importantly, the arbitration agreement
225. See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Worth Capital, Inc., No. 98-7732, 173 F. 3d 844, at *1 (2d Cir.
Mar. 9, 1999) ("A party may be found to have waived its objection to arbitrability, however,
if it has participated extensively in arbitration proceedings without asserting its objection in
timely fashion."); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) ("'[I]t
would be unreasonable and unjust to allow Daniel to challenge the legitimacy of the arbitra-
tion process, in which he had voluntarily participated over a period of several months,
shortly before the arbitrator announced her decision.'" (quoting Fortune, Alsweet & El-
dridge, Inc. v. Daniel, 724 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam))); Daniel, 724 F.2d at
1357 ("[A] party may not submit a claim to arbitration and then challenge the authority of
the arbitrator to act after receiving an unfavorable result."); see also Eleanor L. Grossman,
Participation in Arbitration Proceedings as Waiver of Objections to Arbitrability Under State Law,
56 A.L.Rt 5th 757, § 2(a) (2009) ("As a general rule, participation in an arbitration proceed-
ing on the merits of a dispute will result in a waiver of the right to raise the issue of arbitra-
bility.").
226. See, e.g., Ficek v. S. Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 ( 9 th Cir. 1964) ("A claimant may not volun-
tarily submit his claim to arbitration, await the outcome, and, if the decision is unfavorable,
then challenge the authority of the arbitrators to act." (citing Wooley v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 250 F.2d 86, 91 (5th Cir. 1957))); White v. Kampner, 641 A.2d 1381, 1386 (Conn. 1994)
("Parties may not forego objections to arbitration, gambling upon a favorable result, and
when losing raise the procedural defects in a motion to vacate." (citations, ellipsis, and
bracketing omitted)).
227. See, e.g., Woodcrest Nursing Home v. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied
Servs. Union, 788 F.2d 894, 899 (2d Cir. 1986) (ruling minimal participation "amounting
for the most part to efforts to postpone or delay arbitration" does not mean that the nursing
home waived its right to seek a stay); Pension Plan for Pension Trust Fund for Operating
Eng'rs v. Weldway Constr., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1048 (N.D. Cal, 2013) (refusing to
find waiver despite the fact that the challenging party "participated in selecting an arbitra-
tor, submitted an answering statement with a counterclaim, agreed to wait for the selected
arbitrator to be available, submitted a letter addressing incorrect factual allegations made in
Defendants answer, and participated in a telephonic case management conference."). See
generally Grossman, supra note 225.
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is signed pre-dispute. In such circumstances the logic of the waiver doctrine
makes sense. If a party believes an arbitration agreement is invalid, then when
the dispute arises that party should challenge the agreement instead of moving
forward with arbitration proceedings. Courts reasonably give parties some
leeway if they participate in the arbitration proceedings only on a limited basis,
but, if a party chooses to proceed with arbitration instead of challenging a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement, it might be appropriate to construe that decision
as equivalent to a waiver of all claims that the underlying arbitration agreement
is invalid. Otherwise, the party should have raised the challenge to the arbitra-
tion agreement before participating in the arbitration proceedings.
But the logic of waiver falls woefully short in the context of religious arbi-
tration. As described above, religious arbitration agreements appear to be typi-
cally signed post-dispute.,28 Where parties sign post-dispute religious arbitra-
tion agreements as a result of communal pressure, with the specter of social
sanctions looming in the background, the waiver doctrine can prevent parties
from accessing the protections of common law contract defenses. This is be-
cause the very same communal dynamics pressuring parties to sign the agree-
ments also induces the parties to participate in the proceedings.
The waiver analysis ought to account for such circumstances. The inquiry
should not, as on the standard narrative, focus solely on whether a party's par-
ticipation has crossed some undefined boundary of involvement; instead, it
should consider whether that party's participation was the result of external
dynamics limiting the party's freedom to voluntarily object. In counter-
narrative cases, the execution of the arbitration agreement and the beginning of
the arbitration proceedings can occur simultaneously. In such contexts, infer-
ring waiver merely from participation in the proceedings seems far from justi-
fiable. There is no separate opportunity for a party to challenge the post-
dispute religious arbitration agreement prior to the onset of the proceedings,
and significant forces can be marshaled to inhibit objection once the parties
move into the proceedings themselves.
There are tools internal to waiver doctrine that are useful here. Broadly
speaking, we might address this concern with the observation that, to consti-
tute waiver, a party's participation in arbitration proceedings must be volun-
tary. To the extent that a party's participation is driven by communal pres-
sure-pressure that could qualify as procedural unconscionability-
participation might be understood as involuntary. But the doctrine remains
wholly undeveloped. The fact that waiver doctrine has not been developed in
these contexts is largely tied to the dominance of the standard arbitration nar-
rative and the persistence of the pre-dispute arbitration framework, which
228. See supra notes 109-1o and accompanying text.
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leads courts to import assumptions without inquiring about the unique fea-
tures of counter-narrative forms of arbitration.
Indeed, religious arbitration is not the only arbitral context in which
unique dynamics related to consent and contract defenses emerge. The Su-
preme Court's increasing tendency to conflate various categories of arbitration
has raised analogous issues in the context of labor arbitration. For a long time
the Supreme Court saw commercial arbitration and labor arbitration as two
distinct forms of dispute resolution governed by two different statutory
schemes. 9 In differentiating between commercial and labor arbitration, the
Supreme Court explained that the former "is the substitute for litigation" while
the latter "is the substitute for industrial strife."23 The Court understood labor
arbitration as pursuing values beyond mere dispute resolution; indeed, even in
cases where labor arbitration proceedings might be deemed frivolous, the
Court emphasized the importance of requiring resolution through arbitration
because "[t] he processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values




This division had a number of doctrinal implications,232 including effects
on the scope of claims that could properly be submitted to arbitration. Initially,
even as the Supreme Court explicitly overruled the line of cases limiting the
scope of arbitrable statutory claims, 33 it did so only in the context of commer-
229. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 1, at § 11.3.1 (describing the Supreme Court's labor arbitration
jurisprudence). But see id. § 11.3.2 (noting far less uniformity regarding the treatment of la-
bor arbitration by the federal courts of appeals); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text
(discussing the evolution of the historical division between labor and commercial arbitra-
tion).
230. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (196o).
231. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
232. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Altering Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, 2006 MIcH.
ST. L. REv. 235, 247-253 (discussing how lower courts have articulated the grounds for vacat-
ing labor arbitration awards). See generally Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of La-
bor Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV.
781, 786-826 (2000) (discussing a series of doctrinal implications arising from the division
between commercial and labor arbitration).
233. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("We now
conclude that Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform
construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of
business transactions."); see also Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32
(1987) ("[T]he reasons given in Wilko reflect a general suspicion of the desirability of arbi-
tration and the competence of arbitral tribunals -most apply with no greater force to the ar-
bitration of securities disputes than to the arbitration of legal disputes generally. It is diffi-
cult to reconcile Wilko's mistrust of the arbitral process with this Court's subsequent
decisions involving the Arbitration Act.").
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cial arbitration. Collective bargaining agreements with arbitration provisions,
by contrast, were deemed not to cover a worker's individual statutory claims.234
As the Supreme Court stated in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver:
It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights re-
lated to collective activity, such as the right to strike. These rights are
conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargain-
ing and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the union as col-
lective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union mem-
bers. Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it
concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal em-
ployment opportunities.23
While the persistence of these restrictions on arbitrability in the labor arbitra-
tion context stemmed, in part, from lingering skepticism that arbitrators were
capable of resolving statutory claims,3 6 they more directly derived from wor-
ries about the nature of consent in the labor arbitration context. Accordingly,
the line of argument expressed in Gardner-Denver reasonably restricted the
scope of statutory claims that could be submitted to arbitration pursuant to a
collective-bargaining agreement because of the attenuated nature of individual
consent to "majoritarian" collective bargaining. As noted by the Court, the
"majoritarian" processes in reaching labor agreements can be complex, poten-
tially undermining the adequacy of the consent exercised by individual em-
ployees.
However, the "majoritarian" dynamic also captures the counter-narrative
impulse of labor arbitration; indeed, labor arbitration-in contrast to generic
commercial arbitration- is geared towards achieving therapeutic values as well
234. See Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) ("Because Congress in-
tended to give individual employees the right to bring their minimum-wage claims under
the FLSA in court, and because these congressionally granted FLSA rights are best protected
in a judicial rather than in an arbitral forum, we hold that petitioners' claim is not barred by
the prior submission of their grievances to the contractual dispute-resolution procedures.");
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-54 (1974).
23S. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 51-52 (characterizing agreements to arbitrate claims like Title VII as "prospective waiv-
er[s]" of statutory rights, thereby implying that parties would not be afforded their full
rights under Title VII if those claims were submitted to arbitration); see also id. ("Title VII's
strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free
from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the col-
lective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congres-
sional purpose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights under Title
VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver.").
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as constructing a viable workplace community.237 Accordingly, the Court high-
lighted the communal nature of arbitration, the unique objectives labor arbitra-
tion is geared to achieve and, in turn, the unique problems that arise when it
comes to individual consent. Keeping all these considerations in mind, the
Court in Gardner-Denver maintained the distinction between labor and other
commercial forms of arbitration, protecting employees subject to labor arbitra-
tion agreements by deeming certain statutory claims non-arbitrable in the la-
bor arbitration context. Indeed, differentiating between labor arbitration and
commercial arbitration for the purposes of arbitrating statutory claims in this
way would capture the core intuition of arbitration's counter-narrative, incor-
porating into doctrine the dynamics of the particular arbitral forum and the
mechanisms by which parties contract into it.
The Supreme Court has, however, recently rejected such distinctions be-
tween labor and commercial arbitration.238 In its 2009 decision 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, the Court held that "[tihe decision to fashion a collective-
bargaining agreement to require arbitration of employment-discrimination
claims is no different from the many other decisions made by parties in design-
ing grievance machinery."239 The dissent's attempt to defend the distinction
between labor and commercial arbitration'4 was discarded as flowing from an
outdated skepticism of arbitration.' 4' The Court therefore concluded that
claims under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act could be submitted
to arbitration pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement.4'
The Court's decision in Pyett, however, fails to account sufficiently for the
implications of arbitration's counter-narrative. What meets standards of con-
sent to arbitration in some contexts should not necessarily qualify as consent in
other contexts. This is certainly true in the context of religious arbitration,
where the vagaries of consent require some rethinking of the standard waiver
doctrine. A similar point applies in the context of labor arbitration where the
"majoritarian" dynamics at play in the negotiation of a collective-bargaining
agreement make the standard contractarian model of consent less than relevant
to the question of arbitrability. As a general matter, then, arbitration's counter-
237. See generally Abrams et. al., supra note 8 (explaining the therapeutic value of arbitration with
a particular focus on labor arbitration).
238. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 256 (2009). For discussion of the potential conse-
quences of Pyett, see generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett
Authorizes Arbitration of Unionized Employees' Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEwiS &
CLARKL. REv. 861 (2010).
239. Pyett, 556 U.S. at 256.
240. Id. at 281-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 256 n.5, 265 (majority opinion).
242. Id. at 274.
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narrative highlights the need for a more context-sensitive arbitration doc-
trine- a doctrine that accounts for each party's individual objectives; certainly
not one that is one-size-fits-all.
CONCLUSION
To highlight arbitration's counter-narrative is certainly not to claim that
most parties select arbitration for reasons beyond dispute resolution. As noted
above, statistics demonstrate that, in fact, providing a faster and cheaper meth-
od of dispute resolution is consistently the primary reason that parties forego
litigation in favor of arbitration. 43
But focusing on the dominant dispute-resolution rationale and the domi-
nant narrative that it produces prevents legal doctrine from addressing instanc-
es where parties select arbitration for other reasons. By conflating all forms of
arbitration and then equating arbitration with litigation, courts run the danger
of misapplying legal doctrine and thereby undermining the ability of arbitra-
tion to serve a unique jurisgenerative function. Indeed, the core lesson of arbi-
tration's counter-narrative is that legal doctrines need to be better calibrated to
the range of values a particular arbitration context aims to promote. If success-
fully grafted onto current legal doctrine, the counter-narrative - exemplified
by, but not exclusive to, religious arbitration -holds out to us the hope of un-
locking the transformative potential of arbitration, enabling parties to employ
arbitration not simply as an efficient venue for resolving disputes, but as an al-
ternative forum that can breathe life into mutually shared values.
243. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
